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In attempts to bridge the increasing gap between youth and socialism in the
German Democratic Republic in the 1960s, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) modified its
youth policy by encouraging a socialist patriotic consciousness rather than solely
emphasizing socialist development. For the duration of its statehood, the SED claimed
that socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism were intrinsically connected.
However, in the pursuit of producing a consolidated youth, the SED became divided not
only on the direction of youth policy but also on this symbiotic connection. In his liberal
reform movement, head of state Walter Ulbricht and his advocates focused
predominantly on the construct of nation to define its socialist patriotism. The antireforming splinter group of the SED, spearheaded by party apparatchiks Erich Honecker
and Kurt Hager, worked to remove the all-German component to youth consciousness
and revert back to its allegiance to the Soviet Union and the proletariat revolution. Each
faction sanctioned a youth festival to articulate its position on East German national
consciousness in youth policy and the German question.
This study on the shift in party youth policy from 1961-1967 introduces a
relatively little known festival sanctioned by the SED in 1967. The Wartburgtreffen

commemorated the 150th anniversary of the Burschenschaften, or student fraternities.
These organizations, however, were banned in the DDR, making this event an anomaly of
party ideology. By juxtaposing this festival with an earlier, more pivotal festival – the
Deutschlandtreffen of 1964 – two conclusions can be drawn. First, the power struggle
between the reforming and anti-reforming factions of the SED was decided. After
clamping down on cultural strides in the Kahlschlag Plenum, Honecker and Hager had
achieved the adoption of conservative youth policy within the party. Secondly, with this
defeat of Ulbricht (who officially remained in power until 1971), the borders of the
German socialist Fatherland were solidified. Though Honecker would wrestle with the
concept of nation until the events of 1989, he silenced the last championing of
reunification led by Ulbricht. With the assertion that socialism had been achieved, youth
policy could focus solely on its contributions to proletarian internationalism and the
achievement of a German socialist nation.

It is often said that today‟s student radicals are tomorrow‟s conservatives.
– Rolland Ray Lutz

You who will come to the surface
From the flood that's overwhelmed us and drowned us all
Must think, when you speak of our weakness in times of darkness
That you've not had to face:
Days when we were used to changing countries
More often than shoes,
Through the war of the classes despairing
That there was only injustice and no outrage.
Even so we realized
Hatred of oppression still distorts the features,
Anger at injustice still makes voices raised and ugly.
Oh we, who wished to lay for the foundations for peace and friendliness,
Could never be friendly ourselves.
And in the future when no longer
Do human beings still treat themselves as animals,
Look back on us with indulgence.
– Bertolt Brecht, To Those Born After
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1
INTRODUCTION
“Youth, Fatherland, Socialism”

In honor of the twentieth anniversary of the German Democratic Republic (DDR),
the Jugendhochschule Wilhelm Pieck, the German Academy of Sciences at Berlin and
the Office for Youth Questions held a scientific-propagandistic conference titled “Youth
and Socialist Fatherland.” For two days, 2-3 April 1969, scientists, educators, state
representatives, social organization delegates, and Free German Youth (FDJ)
functionaries assembled in Berlin to discuss the relationships between “Youth, Fatherland
and Socialism.”1 Presenters focused predominantly on the scientific and historical
evidence within Marxism-Leninism that allowed for the development of a statesponsored national consciousness. Although the East German leadership intended to
forge a society that would supersede national consciousness by embracing proletarian
internationalism, the inability to rally the youth to the socialist cause throughout the
1960s led the Socialist Unity Party (SED) to revert to a youth policy that not only defined
their youth as the “better Germans” but also embraced the DDR as a separate nationstate.
The term „nation‟ and its derivates presented problems for the DDR both in its
identity as a socialist state and in its place in the legacy of modern German history. Under
Marxism-Leninism, the concept was theoretically impertinent. As a component of
growing capitalism, Vladimir Lenin argued that nationality would only divide the
working class temporarily. The development of class consciousness within this system
would unite the oppressed proletariat, who, in the subsequent stage of socialism, would
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Walter Haltinner, Dietmar Börnert, Gerhard Bornschein, Konrad Grützmann, Kurt Leuschner. Jugend,
Vaterland, Sozialismus (Berlin: Verlag Junge Welt, 1969), 5.
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abandon their national ties in favor of worldwide revolution.2 This 1913 postulation on
this progression, however, was based on the Russian model, and did little to appease the
question of a formerly united German nation and the politics involved in the West‟s
refusal to acknowledge the DDR as a separate state.3
Aside from ideological issues, in the more recent past, „nation‟ also evoked
negative connotations associated with Hitlerism. Following the Second World War, the
remnants of the Third Reich were divided into two camps. In the West, the Allied powers
of France, Great Britain and the United States sought to bring justice for wartime
atrocities without repeating the debilitating mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles. Many
argued that the harsh measures instilled upon the Germans after the First World War
ushered in the nationalistic fervor and unyielding power of Adolf Hitler. To avoid the
emergence of a second Hitler, and in response to the threat of rising Soviet power in
Eastern Europe, the Allies instead pursued a policy that would accept the past and in its
place recreate the ruins into a united, prosperous, democratic and capitalistic ally. In the
East, the Soviets followed a course of action quite the opposite. In the vein of communist
ideology, war and nationalism, both imperialist (and therefore capitalist) constructs, had
led to the destruction of the German state. As a response to the formation of the Allied
occupants into the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) in May 1949, which claimed to
be the legitimate successor state, the Soviets fostered the creation of the first German
socialist state, the German Democratic Republic (DDR), the following October.
Under these separate flags, each Germany created its own government, body of
laws, domestic and foreign policies, educational system and economy. However, the
2

Peter W. Sperlich. Rotten Foundations: The Conceptual Basis of Marxist-Leninist Regimes of East
Germany and Other Countries of the Soviet Bloc (West Port, CT; London: Praeger, 2002), 56-7.
3
The BRD did not formally recognize the DDR as a state until 1972.

3
specter of the German nation under ties of “Blut und Boden”4 continued to haunt both
entities. Under the tutelage of the Allies, the West Germans generally became overly
accepting and apologetic of the repercussions of buying into the Hitler regime, while their
eastern counterparts, who assumed the title of the „better Germans,‟ refused participation
and therefore responsibility. Debates about reproducing national consciousness in the
DDR depended thenceforth on the distinction between the culturing of a socialist
patriotic consciousness and one of imperialist nationalism.5
Speeches at the “Youth and Socialist Fatherland” conference stressed this
distinction, heralding the role of Marxism-Leninism in the process of Volksbildung, or
national education, while criticizing similar, “manipulative” efforts of the West. For
example, Werner Haltinner, in “The DDR – the true Fatherland of the German youth,ˮ
explicated the theoretical and political fundamental questions in the development of the
socialist national consciousness of youth. Starting with the question of “Was verstehen
wir unter „Vaterland‟?” he explains that the term “Fatherland” is a historical construct
that not only “expresses a given objective, societal reality” but is also the “product of
certain social-economical changes and demands in the development of human society and
its historical progress.” Based on Lenin‟s interpretation of the notion, in terms of social,
political and cultural milieus, the DDR adapted the historical understanding of Fatherland
to one that encompassed the question of class struggle. The workers would thus prove
their historical mission in the struggle for the political and economic power of their class

4

“Blood and soil,” termed by the Nazis, united the German nation under racial and agrarian ties.
Mark R. Thompson, “No Exit: „Nation-stateness‟ and Democratization in the German Democratic
Republic”, Political Studies (1996): 283. See also Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity after the
Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) for a discussion on historical memory, overcoming the past, and
projects for constructing national identity in the DDR.
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and, with that, the true Fatherland.6 Helmut Meier complements Haltinner‟s analysis (and
the SED‟s Volksbildung endeavors) in his dialogue on the problems of Western
nationalism. In “Nationalism as a Component of the Ideological Manipulation of West
German Youth,” he not only chastises the BRD government for the wave of renewed
nationalism associated with the emergency laws and the deterioration of suffrage, but he
also cites it as an ideological weapon devised by Western imperialists, like NATOGeneral Wolf Graf Baudissin, against all socialist states.7 While these constitute a small
percentage of presenters (two of the sixty-three), such assertions reveal that the pursuit
for national consciousness in the DDR became self-protective and, despite the
antagonistic ideological platform it had previously adopted on the subject of patriotism,
justifiable on both a state and international scale.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, as the concept of nation-state no longer became
applicable to either the DDR or the BRD,8 German national identity in both states shifted
from one of power and politics to one of language and culture. 9 The main trend in
pursuing this new identity rested on the ideals of cultural heritage and the nineteenthcentury creation of the modern German state. Despite ideological divisions, both states
recognized that three pivotal foundations had produced the modern German identity: the
6
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7
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French Revolution, the Befreiungskriege (or Wars of Liberation), and the student
movement for reform and emancipation. From 1770 to 1813, these factors not only
molded a new German political and intellectual identity, but they also directly challenged
the old, feudalistic notion of nationhood.
The French Revolution contributed to the formation of this modern national
consciousness in two ways. First, it laid the groundwork for the modern constitutional
state. Unlike the restraints of feudalism, this new state promoted, among others, the ideas
of “the separation of justice and administration, public and oral court proceedings, trial
by jury, freedom of the press, and equality before the law for all citizens.”10 Secondly, it
established a new concept of the nation and a new political understanding of that nation
throughout much of Europe. The will of the people, rather than that of the monarch,
legitimated political unity. Through a “social contract,” a free and equal society should be
founded, and through these proclaimed natural, universal rights, the nation would be open
to everyone.11 Until the Befreiungskriege, however, the influence of the French
Revolution on the German consciousness remained a political, not an ideological one. As
late as 1811, Joachim Heinrich Campe wrote disparagingly of this lack of a German
nation, “One speaks and reads much about the British, French, Swedish, Spanish, etc.
people. Unfortunately, only a German Volk seems to be lacking, and one can only hope,
that one [a Volk] will emerge out of the ruins of the German Reich.”12
As predicated by Campe, a sense of emergency was needed for the German Volk
to be realized. While the French Revolution produced the groundwork for the idea of the
10

Horst Ueberhorst, Wolfgang Stump. Friedrich Ludwig Jahn 1778/1978 (Munich: Heinz Moos Verlag,
1978), 38.
11
Gerhard Schäfer, “Die frühe Burschenschaftsbewegung,” in D. Heither, M. Gehler, A. Kurth, G.
Schäfer‟s Blut und Paukboden: Eine Geschichte der Burschenschaften (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1997), 14.
12
Ibid., 14.

6
new nation, the French occupation of much of the German Confederation incited the
development of a specific modern sense of German national identity. Through the current
of Romanticism, a spiritual upheaval replaced the rational-progressive elements of
identity with mythical-irrational rudiments, including: an organic concept, with which
man would be restored by the enlightenment that had freed him from his constraints; the
dominance of emotion over reason; the priority of the organic whole of community over
the individual; the idea of a natural historical development of the organic being; the
ascent of the “Volksgeist” in history as a subject; and the romantic concept of the
inevitability of the German people though a biological premise. Due to the sense of
national crisis implemented by the occupation, the ruling ideology that emerged did not
take on the democratic, bourgeois-progressive and restorative tendencies as seen in
France. Rather, the birth of the modern bourgeois German nation resorted not to a
political clarification but a political romanticism that, unlike its French example,
constructed an ideological, apolitical concept of the Volk.13
“Self-definitions of a modern German nation” competed in both politics and
culture until 1806, when Napoleon defeated the Prussian military. With the lack of
political control, the onus fell onto culture to continue the reformation of German
identity. The French example of the Jacobin Terror alongside the lack of progressive
policies in the occupied parts of the German Confederation only solidified quelling the
idea of renewed political enthusiasm.14 Once again, culture replaced politics in promoting
the German identity, and the concept of the Kulturnation, which “claimed that culture
13
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needed to precede politics and suggested that German culture, unsullied by political
involvement and unfettered by an ossified classicism, could prepare the culmination of
human culture for the benefit of humanity,” was born.15
While French influence, in terms of revolutionary ideals and humiliating
occupation, definitively spurred students to unite in the name of protecting and promoting
their own German Fatherland, the ideas of reform that led students to the forefront of the
national struggle began long before their volunteerism in the Lützow Freikorps.
Wolfgang

Hardtwig

details

this

development

in

his

analysis

of

the

Urburschenschaftsbegwegung, or early-Burschenschaft movement, at the beginning of
the nineteenth century as a continuation of the student reform and emancipation efforts
that started in the second half of the previous century. From 1770 to roughly 1790,
student organizations, primarily the newly-minted Orden and Landsmannschaften (later
termed “Korporationen,” or more commonly “Korps”), pushed for two specific reforms.
The first could be considered a revamping of the personal relationship of organization. In
the spirit of universal human rights, the focus landed on brotherhood, targeting
specifically the pathos of friendship. “Friendship is understood as mutual support, as
brotherly help, as a duty to selflessness, as the responsibility for one another, as
emotional closeness; it should, at the very least be the avowed intention of every honest
fellow student, without the cachet of power, to turn towards society and religion.” 16 The
second reform platform, initiated by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, focused on purifying the
student organizations from the traditional immoral practices associated with their
15

Maike Oergel, “Revolutionaries, Traditionalists, Terrorists? The Burschenschaften and the German
Counter-Cultural Tradition,” in Steve Giles, Maike Oergel, ed. Counter Cultures in Germany and Central
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16
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behavior, particularly dueling, drinking, and skirmishing.17 This focus on the
“Zivilisationsmodi” intensified in light of French occupation, as the need to preserve both
the culture and the nation escalated.
While the BRD tended to focus on the heritage of the modern German state in its
adoption of high culture, the DDR addressed the concept of the modern nation alongside
the emergence of the modern German student, placing the youth as progenitors of
modernity and forgers of the nation-state. As the German Confederation confronted the
foreign influences of revolutionary ideals, occupation and reform, a new nationalism
based on politics and ideology emerged to mobilize the masses. The largest demographic
this shift influenced was the group who volunteered to fight against Napoleon – young
men. This resulted not only in an upsurge of politicization in the universities, but also a
fusion of the role of the student with the quest for national unity. While both the BRD
and the DDR shied away from too powerful a youth presence in their own states, the
latter viewed youth as the vehicle for disseminating the socialist orthodoxy. In the
Jugendgesetz (youth law) of 1950, it stated:
“The most important task in the formation of the developed socialist society is to
bring up all young people to be citizens who are true to the ideas of socialism,
who think and act as patriots and internationalists, and who strengthen socialism
and staunchly defend it against all enemies.”18
As a result of this interpretation, the DDR emphasized the role of youth in the
development of the early German state, and in the 1960s adopted the legacy of the
student fraternities, or Burschenschaften, that emerged from the early years of the student
movement in the nineteenth century. At this time, Napoleon‟s strength and numbers in

17

Schäfer, “Die frühe Burschenschaftsbewegung,” 17.
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under Honecker,” German History 10.3 (1992): 318.
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Europe began to dwindle. As a result, the political situation of France as well as the lands
she occupied lost stability. This opened dialogue on the issues of independence and what
type of government would follow suit. By 1814, as Napoleon‟s defeat neared, two
dominant groups of thought emerged: the Prussian-conservative camp and the liberalnational group, which consisted mainly of progressive intellectuals like Ernst Moritz
Arndt, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and Karl Friedrich Friesen.19 Princes and intellectuals had
joined forces at the onset of occupation, hoping to secure a future Germany by mobilizing
the masses with the promise of political, social and national reform. As the defeat of
France became more feasible, however, the relationship between these two groups
became one less of cooperation and one more of antagonism.
As the Prussian-conservative camp sought support from its own imperial ranks,
the progressive intellectuals, in the quest for spiritual renewal, bourgeois emancipation,
and national unity, looked toward the minds they could more easily mold – their
students.20 In 1811, “Turnvater” Jahn and Friesen developed a proposal entitled
“Ordnung und Einrichtung des deutschen Burschenwesens.ˮ In this essay, they called for
the “organization and mobilization of students nationally into a political (and military)
opposition in line with their own political and ideological aims.” By politicizing their
students, they could initiate the formation of their theoretical society based on “an active
life in the service of the Fatherland and a people based on the middle-class efficiency and
the Protestant work ethic.”21 As the intellectuals fostered an aggressive, militant, and
revolutionary patriotism they undoubtedly turned the universities into breeding grounds
19
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for their political-ideological national agenda.22 The first instance of the intellectuals‟
success in converting the young masses arrived with the slew of volunteers in the Lützow
Freikorps, which throughout 1813 continued to gain waves of student volunteers, many
of whom, like the young poet Theodor Körner, became immortalized in the
Völkerschlacht, or Battle of Nations, near Leipzig in October.
Once these politicized students joined the ranks of those in combat, enduring the
hardships of battle and the brotherhood of the common fight, the formation of the
Burschenschaften was not far off. Both Halle and Jena had become the centers of student
unrest, and the Hallenser23 in particular, had not come to terms with the way in which
Napoleon had disseminated their Landsmannschaften, or student communities, in 1806.
On 1 November 1814, the majority of the former Landsmannschaften united once again,
this time under the name of “Teutonia”, the black and white colors of Prussia, and the
flag of “Honor – Freedom – Fatherland”. In 1815, these students returned to the
university, yet they could not shake what they had experienced in battle. Many reverted
to wearing their Lützow soldier uniforms, which proudly bore the colors of black, red,
and gold; not only were these the colors of the old Reich‟s coat of arms but also those of
the Landsmannschaft “Vandalia” in Jena, from which many of the founders of the
Urburschenschaft originated. In June, one hundred thirteen students, representing the
Landsmannschaften of “Vandalia,” “Saxonia,” “Thuringia,” and “Franconia” to name a
few, symbolically lowered their flags to concede their autonomy and confirm their part in
the unity of one joint Burschenschaft.24 A reading of the “Vandalia” Constitution
followed, in which representatives democratically voted on revisions. After the last draft
22
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was finalized, the colors of the newly-minted student fraternity were selected.
Unsurprisingly, the model cast by the Lützow Freikorps heavily influenced this choice;
the black-red-gold was unanimously embraced. A second patriotic song by Arndt closed
the foundational ceremony of the Burschenschaft.25
From its inception in 1949, the DDR had embarked on a “campaign of ideological
consolidation” of the party, in which it not only combated the remnants of its Nazi past
but also acknowledged the leading role of the Soviet Union in this process.26 Under the
platform of ideological conformity, youth policy ascended to one of the primary concerns
of the SED. In theory, this involvement of youth in the structuring of socialism would
produce a population fully dedicated to principles like state ownership, equality of
property and maximum distribution of national income, while paving the way for the
proletariat international revolution. In practice, this replication of the age-old adage,
“Who has the youth, has the future,”27 became challenged by the emergence of a youth
subculture28 in the 1960s that, entangled in the debates on reunification and the two state
theory, preferred the lures of the West: mass markets, pop music, and reprieve from
political obligation.
In attempts to bridge the increasing gap between youth and socialism, the SED
modified its youth policy by encouraging a national consciousness acceptable to socialist
25
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tenets. Socialist patriotism, as the “great commandment of the Marxist-Leninist
Weltanschauung,” consisted of “revolutionary communist morality, militant atheism,
devotion to the party, the collectivist attitude toward labor, the class-oriented approach to
social life, the international brotherhood of communist nations, undying solidarity with
the Soviet Union, faith in the historic superiority of socialism over capitalism, an
irreconcilable opposition to bourgeois ideology, and hatred toward the imperialists and
other enemies of the socialist Fatherland.”29 For the duration of its statehood, the SED
claimed that socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism were intrinsically
connected.30 However, in the pursuit of producing a consolidated youth, the SED became
divided not only on the direction of youth policy but also on this symbiotic connection. In
his liberalization of youth policy, head of state Walter Ulbricht and his advocates focused
predominantly on the construct of nation to define its socialist patriotism. The antireforming faction31, spearheaded by party apparatchiks Erich Honecker and Kurt Hager,
worked to redefine the concept of „nation‟ by removing the all-German component to
youth consciousness and reverting back to its allegiance to the proletariat revolution. At

29
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the head of both of these policies was a youth festival that encouraged East/West student
dialogue.
In the focus on the shift in party youth policy from 1961-1967 along the lines of
socialist patriotism, this study diverges from other scholarship on the issues of national
identity and youth policy in both the BRD and the DDR by introducing a relatively little
known festival sanctioned by the SED in 1967. The Wartburgtreffen commemorated the
150th anniversary of the Burschenschaften, or student fraternities. Considering the
reliance on the youth as forgers of the state, a commemoration of nineteenth-century
student fraternities would not seem out of line with party policy. While the major aspects
of the original Wartburgfest – the acknowledgement of a common nationality, the pledge
to a united German Fatherland, and demands for a democratic revolution – mirrored
similar demands that the SED strove for in creating their modern socialist state, the image
of the Burschenschaften, however, was not necessarily ideal. Historically, this nineteenthcentury construct symbolized bourgeois decadence, radical and fanatic nationalism, and,
in some factions, severe xenophobia. For these reasons, the SED issued a ban on these
organizations, making this event an anomaly of ideology.
By juxtaposing this festival with an earlier, more pivotal festival – the
Deutschlandtreffen of 1964 – two conclusions can be drawn. First, the power struggle
between the reforming and anti-reforming factions of the SED was decided. The turning
point in the power struggle was the Kahlschlag Plenum in 1965. Traditionally it has been
known for its swinging attacks against the reforms in culture, in which the anti-reformers
of the SED “criticized the artistic-ideological concepts of certain films, television
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programs, theatre pieces and literary works,”32 and in economics, where the second phase
of the NÖS still had not achieved the technological revolution. In the vein of retracting
reform, this conservative strain also took the opportunity to target Ulbricht‟s youth
policy. Though he had the support of Leonid Brezhnev, who took over the role of party
leader in Moscow in October 1964, Honecker also needed the support of the party. In
order to garner this support, he made every effort to illustrate the dangers of Ulbricht‟s
liberalism. For instance, in the summer of 1965, he surreptitiously commissioned an
investigation into youth criminality. By July, the committee had submitted a report to the
Central Committee (ZK) that concluded youth crime was on the rise, despite statistics
that showed the opposite. By conjuring the image of a dissident youth, particularly with
the interest in rising “hooliganism” shown by the Ministry of State Security (MfS),
Honecker gained the support he needed to override the youth policy reform. Not only did
the Kahlschlag Plenum trump Ulbricht‟s “liberal youth interlude” but it also elevated
Honecker within the popularity ranks of the party. 33 This would have profound
consequences for the shift in youth policy. Where Ulbricht focused on reform while
instilling culture and national comparison in the building of socialism, Honecker, as he
made evident in the Kahlschlag Plenum and the Wartburgtreffen, preferred to eliminate
the cultural element. Under this reinterpretation of national consciousness, the antireformers endorsed a youth display that would promote neither an all-German element
nor allow cultural freedoms expressed at the Deutschlandtreffen.
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The Wartburgtreffen also solidified the ideological and physical borders of the
German Fatherland. Though Honecker would wrestle with the concept of nation until the
events of 1989, the last championing of reunification, led by Ulbricht, was put to rest.
With the assertion that socialism (and a separate German state) had been achieved, youth
policy could focus solely on its contributions to proletarian internationalism. With the
passing of a new constitution in 1968, the anti-reformers formally achieved the
distinction between the DDR and BRD as “not two states of the same nation, but two
nations in states of different social order.”34 Though they had the youth, they only
temporarily had the future.35

Historiography
The first part of the national period of the cultural development of the DDR
invites a number of interpretations to identify not only the role of culture in shaping
youth policy, but also the relationship between the party and its citizens. Most historians
who specialize in this time period acknowledge the dissonance within the party, at least at
base level, and how it affected certain legislation, domestic and international politics, and
the fulfillment of the technical revolution. Paths diverge primarily in the dialectics
between top-down and grass-roots approaches, protest and general acceptance stances,
and success and failures of the party as a whole. All of these paths must, first and
foremost, confront the issue of ideological partiality.
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In the dichotomy of the Cold War, the ideological origin of a scholar can serve as
the single most differentiating factor in separating his or her work from other literature.
While this difference can contribute to the development of scholarly topics, it can also
discredit the historian when the intended audience is unfamiliar with the tenets of a given
approach. Although few works used in the research of this study presented such a
challenge, Andreas Dorpalen‟s German History in Marxist Perspective: The East
German Approach was a great resource. Not only does he provide helpful explanations
on Marxist-Leninist views of historical subjects but he also assesses how DDR
scholarship develops, particularly in response to West German historiography, and
diverges from traditional Marxist approaches.36 This work thoroughly examines the
major topics of the German national past from the early Middle Ages to its publication in
1985, but in contrast to non-Marxist accounts, it revokes the „unique‟ history of
Germany, opting instead explain it is a part of the worldwide historical process.37
Dorpalen‟s main contribution to the dialogue on German history is his analysis of
what he calls the major “thema probandum” of German historical research and teaching –
the issue of German unification. As Marxist-Leninists, East German scholars “have to
show that at all turning points of German history – at the time of the Reformation and the
great Peasants‟ war, at the time of the Wars of Liberation, in the Revolution of ‟48, in the
November Revolution of 1918 and during the following years, and again, now after [our]
liberation from fascism by the Soviet Army – there existed serious democratic forces
which fought for a united German in the form of a peace-loving, democratic, and
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sovereign national state.”38 With this obligation, the DDR historian walks a fine line
between scholar and propagandist. As scholars, most DDR historians “pride themselves
in developing a truly „national‟ history in which the working class is accorded its due
place in history.”39 In the struggle against Western interpretations, however, the historian
is obligated “to help strengthen the national consciousness of the DDR citizenry and thus
aid in stabilizing its socialist order” and, where possible, “convert the West German
working class and other sympathetic elements to the socialist cause.”40
Dorpalen‟s study was published in 1985, and at this point, he concludes that while
there are certain incongruities between theory and praxis in Marxist perspective and DDR
interpretation, at least East German historians have been able to produce “an integrated
conception of German history.”41 This assertion has some bearing, yet one thing that
Dorpalen does not consider in this critique on Western scholarship is the concept of
national consciousness in the BRD. This division in what is German (and what is not)
lends a certain credibility to the „uniqueness‟ theory. Without the assumption that a
progressive tradition of German history is part of the worldwide historical process,
Western historians were faced with piecing together the history of the BRD while
simultaneously debating the problem of how (and whether or not) East Germans fit into
the picture.
Gebhard Schweigler was one of the first scholars to tackle this issue of German
identity based on the divisions of nation and state.

Published in 1973,

Nationalbewußtsein in der BRD und DDR sought to answer the status of the German
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question by investigating the national consciousness, or Bewußtsein, of pre-war
Germany. By comparing the attitudes of citizens from the BRD and the DDR in the early
1970s, he concluded that the pre-1945 Bewußtsein had been replaced by the national
consciousness of each perspective state. Many of the East German attitudes that
Schweigler relies on in concluding a decisive national consciousness on the part of each
German state were those by DDR citizens in the West, either visitors in East Berlin or
those who had emigrated. While this work offers a strong analysis of the issues of nation
and state, Schweigler admits, “the amount of hard data on the state of East German
national attitudes and consciousness is limited and any conclusions must remain tentative
if not tenuous. Although the SED is known to have conducted its own public opinion
research, the results have never been published.”42
Peter C. Ludz seconds this lack of empirical evidence, arguing that by 1975, the
majority of DDR citizens still could not view the BRD as a foreign country. In Die DDR
zwischen Ost und West von 1961 bis 1976, he comes to this conclusion not through an
introspective analysis of German national consciousness based on discontent with the
regime, but through a series of other crucial topics that challenged the regime after the
building of the Wall. By examining the social structure of the SED and how it affected
foreign and domestic policies, rather than adopting a theoretical or philosophical
approach like Schweigler‟s or Benedict Anderson‟s Imagined Communities, he unravels
the extent to which interpretations of how to achieve socialism divided the party, and in
effect, stagnated a concerted effort to produce a strictly East German Bewußtsein.
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This top-down approach in many ways dictated the pace of scholarship on the
DDR, which after the 1960s became increasingly Western-oriented. Rather than
encouraging scholars to independently participate in the historiographical dialogue on the
issue of national consciousness, the party selectively directed the course of perspective
and scholarship. Starting in 1964, the Zentrale Forschungsplan allocated topics of
research “worked out jointly by the SED and social scientists to give to historians‟ work a
direction most in accord with the political, social, and other needs of the country.” 43 (This
helps to explain the resurgence of interest on the Burschenschaften and the Wartburgfest,
for example). In 1972, the Zentrale Forschungsplan declared the aim of historical
scholarship to show the DDR as “the legitimate heir to all the revolutionary, progressive,
and humanistic traditions of German history and above all the German workers‟
movement.”44 This selectivity drew criticism from most Western historians, yet Ludz
explains this position simply as a new phase of DDR scholarship, succeeding scholarship
as aggressive debate with the adversarial system under the leadership of the
totalitarianism concept (1950s) and scholarship in terms of the imminent acquisition,
description, representation, analysis, and assessment of the political and social system of
the DDR (1960s). This new phase envelops analyses within the comparative German
scholarship that was introduced with the “Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der
Nation.”45
The defeat of socialism in 1989 officially ended the national period in the DDR.
The subsequent reunification posed a series of problems in integrating different
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ideological systems, both within society and German historiography. Despite this
difficulty, the fall of the Wall also created a window of opportunity for scholars by
opening previously closed files and archives. This renovation in academics ushered in a
new approach to DDR history that incorporated Alltagsgeschichte, a movement of
“everyday history,” with the grass-roots approach of Marxist history. As a result,
throughout the past twenty years, historians have generally adopted one of two
approaches in writing DDR history. Some, like Monika Kaiser and Alan McDougall,
focus on institutional and political history, while others, especially British historians
Mark Allinson and Corey Ross, adopt a social history approach, which emphasizes the
“popular reception and implementation of policy instead of its formulation.”46
In examining the inner-party struggle in shaping national consciousness,
examined exclusively by Moniker Kaiser‟s Machtwechsel von Ulbricht zu Honecker:
Funktionsmechanismen der SED-Diktatur in Konfliktsituationen 1962 bis 1972, utilizing
both of these approaches balances insight into the question of the socialist revolution,
attempting to answer whether socialism was actually achieved in the DDR, and if not,
which level (local or government) hindered this development. In the dialogue on the
success and failures of the regime, the grass-roots approach tends to center on the
problems within the system, particularly in debunking the myth that the DDR was a
highly centralized, homogenous society.47 Mark Allinson argues through his study of
Bezirk Erfurt in Politics and Popular Opinion in East Germany, 1945-68, that the DDR
was a relatively stable and normal society regardless of the question of socialism because,
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outside of Berlin, citizens focused on everyday life, not on major political issues. For
example, in most literature the construction of the Berlin Wall has been one of the most
contested constructions in German history, yet Allinson disputes its importance in Erfurt,
where “patterns of conformity and non-conformity across the population were not
particularly affected by its construction, and [that] after August 1961 life quickly settled
back into the previously established contours.”48
Corey Ross‟ focus on Berlin and Brandenburg in roughly the same time period, in
Constructing Socialism at the Grass-roots: The Transformation of East Germany, 194565, identifies the SED‟s failings not in its inability to look outside of Berlin, but rather the
variability of “the communist leadership‟s ability to realize its objectives and control
social developments in different spheres.” Ross is thus more convincing in his approach
to explain the SED‟s failed attempts in creating the new socialist man and society despite Honecker‟s belief that by 1965 „real existing socialism‟ was starting to take hold
– because of the ineffectuality of the local functionaries.49
SED functionaries included branches of party leadership in the multiple districts
throughout the DDR and extended to areas that required party guidance, like the trade
unions and the youth. Due to the interest of the party dialogue with the youth, the pivotal
studies by Dorothee Wierling (Geboren im Jahr Eins) and Marc-Dietrich Ohse (Jugend
nach dem Mauerbau: Anspassung, Protest und Eigensinn (1961-1974)), offer the best
interpretations of the shifts within youth policy, and with their grass-roots approach, the
best depiction of the general response, both supportive and critical, to the policies of both
the reforming and anti-reforming factions.
48

Mark Allinson, Politics and Popular Opinion in East Germany, 1945-96 (Manchester; New York:
Manchester University Press, 2000), 119.
49
Ross, Constructing Socialism at the Grass-roots, 197.

22
The number one vehicle in implementing the changes in youth policy was the
FDJ. Ulrich Mӓhlert and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan offer the most recent, comprehensive
analysis of this youth organization of the entire span of the DDR. Blaue Hemden, rote
Fahnen: Die Geschichte der Freie Deutsche Jugend not only traces the shifts within the
youth organization along the lines of national policy, but it also supplements the text with
an extensive amount Politbüro and other archival documents. In conjunction with
Mählert and Stephan, Alan McDougall‟s Youth Politics in East Germany: The Free
German Youth Movement, 1945-68, the best English resource on the subject and a
“straightforward account of the „Stalinization‟ of the FDJ,” uses the history of this youth
organization to disprove two “long-standing and incorrect” arguments: that the DDR was
simply a Soviet satellite, and that the DDR was a totalitarian dictatorship.50
Most of the scholarship discussed thus far includes some analysis of the
Deutschlandtreffen. However, the subject of the Burschenschaften and the Wartburgfeste
of 1817 and 1967 are eliminated from this dialogue and hence must be examined as a
parallel historiography. This, however, presents two problems in light of the pattern of
DDR historiography. The first was implicated by Andreas Dorpalen in his discussion on
the Zentrale Forschungsplan of 1964, in which topics were “worked out jointly by the
SED and social scientists to give to historians‟ work a direction most in accord with the
political, social, and other needs of the country.” With this in mind, the resurgence of
interest in the field, primarily by historians Günter Steiger, Willi Schrӧder and Helmut
Asmus, becomes clouded by ideological partiality.“The Marxist historiography of the
DDR surely recognized the political role of the Burschenschaften, particularly the 150th
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anniversary of the founding of the Burschenschaften and the Wartburgfest, whose history
was later neglected because the national traditions were widely held to be suspect.”51
The second problem in including this historiography with the rest of the dialogue
on the DDR in the 1960s is the debate between DDR and BRD historians in who the
legacy of Wartburg belongs to. Günter Steiger particularly attacks the West‟s research
and celebrations of this past in Ideale und Irrtürmer eines deutschen Studentenlebens
1817-1820. “It [respecting the historiography on the Burschenschaften from the past 60
years] is important to stress that the present West German Burschenschaft in their
blinding hate towards the DDR make believe that in Jena, as in all universities of our
Worker-and-Peasant-State, there is no longer any „free scientific research.‟ If that were
the case, we would certainly be wary of publishing such a substantive problematic source
like Haupt‟s „Selbstbekenntnis‟ instead of, as the West German Burschenschaft in
preparation for their 150th anniversary had done, an unproblematic excerpt from a
romantic book.”52
This antagonism from DDR historians toward their Western counterparts held
some justification. As Robert Adam points out, the support and influence of the United
States and Britain for the BRD made the relationship between the German historians
unbalanced. However, it is also important to note that the two leading authorities on the
Vormärz period - Paul Wentzcke and Günther Heydemann – had been active members of
the Burschenschaften and Western-oriented. As a result, the Anglo-Saxon/Western
interpretation of German history often overshadowed and discredited those from the
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DDR.53 The most recent comprehensive of the Burschenschaften, Michael Gehler‟s and
Dieter Heither‟s edited volume Blut und Paukboden: Eine Geschichte der
Burschenschaften is primarily an extension of this exclusion of the East. Heither et al
identify the changes to the Burschenschaften through the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries and include chapters that address issues, like gender and New Right extremism,
which usually do not surface in the historiography. The flaw with this work is that it
concerns itself specifically with the Burschenschaften in the BRD. While the
organizations were outlawed in the DDR, the interest in the Wartburgfest and the
restoration of the Wartburg castle and Denkmal in the early 1950s would provide an
interesting parallel to the history of the DB in the BRD.
The historiography of the national period of the DDR posed thus far illustrates the
challenges of juxtaposing the two inter-German youth festivals, the Deutschlandtreffen
(1964) and the Wartburgtreffen (1967), that display the shift in national consciousness
and youth policy between the two strains of the SED. In many cases, a reversion to party
documents or, in the case of the Wartburgtreffen, an analysis of archival records, was
needed to differentiate the arguments presented by various scholars. The parallels of the
historiographies of DDR history and the legacy of the Burschenschaften demand a
reading not just of contemporary works, but also pivotal nineteenth century documents
that pertain to the interpretation of ideological platforms. Despite these challenges, this
study aims to contribute to the dialogue of “Jugend, Sozialismus, Vaterland” by
incorporating the element that initiated the modern student movement – the
Burschenschaften.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Struggle to Give Youth the Word54

In the square of Marx-Engels-Platz on 17 May 1964, over five hundred thousand
German youth the BRD and DDR congregated in the name of peace and friendship. The
photography of Thomas Billhardt captures an exquisite panorama of this day‟s events.
Against the backdrop of the Palast der Republik, a crowd of spirited blue-shirted
members of the FDJ, interspersed with their Western counterparts clad in suits and
dresses, clutch bouquets of flowers while boasting banners that broadcast slogans such as,
“For contact with the youth of the DDR,” “Negotiation is better than opening fire!”, and
“For the stopping of rearmament in both German states.” Further stills magnify
individual youth, eagerly engaged in dialogue with SED functionaries and cultural
outreaches such as music, book signings and theater. In these images of the
Deutschlandtreffen, not only does the unity of German youth disguise the dissonance
between Berlin and Bonn but it also evokes the image of a youth enamored with the
promises of the banner raised the highest, “Our way – Peace and Socialism.”55
This shining display of the integration of youth into the shaping of socialism
could only have been a glimmering hope at the closing of the East German border three
years prior. At this point, the German youth were more staunchly divided by state
borders, as the Berlin Wall prevented the crossing of individuals and, at least in theory,

54

John Rodden, Repainting the Little Red Schoolhouse: A History of Eastern German Education, 19451995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 124. One of the slogans of the Jugendgesetz of 1964 that
embodied the „new trust in the young guard‟ chorused “The youth have the word!”
55
Sarah Kirsch, Rainer Kirsch. Berlin – Sonnenseite. Deutschlandtreffen der Jugend in der Hauptstadt der
DDR, Berlin 1964 (Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1964), 124-37. The text that accompanies these pictures
seconds the estimate of the party of those involved in the Deutschlandtreffen at 560,000. Other sources, like
Ulrich Mählert and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, in Blaue Hemden - rote Fahnen: Die Geschichte der Freien
Deutschen Jugend (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1996), cite the number to be 535,000 with 25,000 of that
figure from West Germany, 155.

26
culture. In the DDR, the youth were particularly disaffected with the regime and apathetic
to the promises of socialism, and as a result, unconsolidated in terms of state allegiance
and participation in the FDJ. In order to rally the youth to an authoritarian, seemingly
desperate system (as many interpreted this edifice as “providing eloquent testimony to
communism's failure”56) Ulbricht returned to the lesson of his predecessors that
incorporated youth and with the propagation of the national identity. This chapter focuses
on youth policy from 1961-64, where Ulbricht worked at recreating a national youth
consciousness that would foremost solidify the difference between East and West, while
building the East up as the “better Germans.” Through the lenses of socialist patriotism,
liberal reform, and hands-on shaping of socialism, this consciousness would in effect
produce a more personal and devoted investment to the state.
To understand the reversion to the nation construct in youth policy, a background
into the disaffection with the state would be useful. As previously stated, the Berlin Wall
signified a failure of socialism to win over its citizens. To promote a more positive
interpretation and necessity for the barricade, Ulbricht defended its construction in the
name of “antifascist protection,”57 citing that, “Many of those who until now have not
been persuaded will now understand more easily that an amicable solution to the
Germany question is only possible through maximal strengthening of the worker-andpeasant-power in the German Democratic Republic and through the taming of
militarization in West Germany. That is the premise for the volition of the separation of
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our nation.”58 Few, however, were fooled by the shroud of this “protection against
fascism.” The culprit was not fascism, but the problem of emigration. From 13 August
1961 onward Ulbricht shied away from commenting publicly about this issue, fearing it
would accentuate the increasing agitation and disapproval of his regime. Despite this
neglectful stance, the figures of refugees spoke volumes about which Germany had more
appeal.
As popular discontent with the Ulbricht regime reached an all-time high in 1961,
the need arose to not only solidify the border in protection of the socialist state, but also
to revitalize trust and enthusiasm for the regime. Though the Wall could be interpreted as
an indication of socialism‟s failures, others, particularly within the ranks of the SED,
chose to welcome the structure as a stepping stone for a shift in party politics. Party
functionaries in line with Ulbricht‟s vision of modernizing socialism believed the Wall
“gave politics more freedom to open up and come to terms with a population now fixed
in place.”59 Because neither superpower had intervened to prevent the Wall, Ulbricht also
found a new self-confidence in his role as head of state. He issued a new platform, termed
“change through rapprochement,”60 which focused not only on modernizing socialism,
but also on increasing political stabilization. In order to achieve these goals and divert
attention away from the problems that had incited emigration, the SED leader issued a
series of reforms, most notably the Neues Ökonomisches System (New Economic System,
or NÖS) in 1963.
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As part of this modernization process, Ulbricht also elevated his own cult of
personality away from the hardlining Stalinist tactics of the previous decade into one that
now exuded him as a “wise and good father of the country.”61 One of the areas that this
“wise and good father” had to reform the most, however, was one with his “children.”
The vast majority of the one hundred-eighty thousand plus who had fled in 1961 certainly
came from the ranks of the professionals and skilled workers, as the argument against
emigration pledged, but the majority age group of those fleeing is particularly telling.
From January to August 1961, those under the age of twenty-five constituted an average
of 49.6 percent of the total refugees; those between eighteen and twenty-one accounted
for 26.6% of that total.62 As the border had been officially sealed, so too had the outlet for
disgruntled youth. Ulbricht could not simply pursue modernization through economics to
placate this substratum of society.
“Decent youth never reacts to this indoctrinating tactic with hypocrisy, but by
rebellion or – since it is impossible for those living in the midst of Soviet troops to
rebel – by flight. That is why young folks are always among those escaping,
youths who were not only well off materially, but were excellently situated and
had a free foot toward a rapid rise to success [that is, on Communism‟s terms].
They turn their backs on that chance and enter the Western world. They do not
enter an unknown, neither do they go where there is enticing bait; they leave
because something oppresses them. The flight of youth is the most perceptible
and visible defeat of a political regime that is striving to create the global
impression that it would, if possible, mold the world of tomorrow.”63
To ensure the future of the DDR, and more importantly, to avoid a situation similar to
that of 1953, or even the 1956 Hungarian crisis, internal reform had to include a
substantial focus on youth policy.
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Following the solidification of Berlin‟s borders in August 1961, the relationship
between the government and the youth was exceptionally unstable, particularly due to the
initial rigidity on what could be termed the “youth question.” Generational rifts and
Western influences caused many party members to view the youth with suspicion, while
the youth criticized the incongruities “between ideology and praxis, between rhetoric and
action on the part of the SED leadership.”64 Aside from this unsteady relationship, the
SED also had to cater to the fact that the youth as a whole remained heavily
unconsolidated. As a result, Ulbricht had to initially forego the complete reforms of the
rest of the “liberal

youth interlude” that characterized the mood of the

Deutschlandtreffen. Before 1963, SED youth policy focused on reform, but rather than
one of liberalization, this interim period worked toward resolving divisive issues, such as
the disinterest in the Nationale Volksarmee (National People‟s Army, or NVA) and the
incompetency of the FDJ, that left many youth skeptical of the SED and out of touch with
any sense of state allegiance.
The relatively late founding of a state military in 1956 symbolizes the DDR‟s
hesitancy to rearm. Until the closing of the borders, the NVA received comparatively
little attention. At the bequest of both the DDR and its Soviet ally, service had not been
compulsory. Based on the literature condemning the Second World War and the Hitler
dictatorship, the SED viewed war as an imperialist construct, and it considered the base
existence of troops on its soil as a somewhat contestable necessity. As vast amounts of
young people fled the East, another concern over conscription was that it would only
amplify emigration in order to evade military service. The Soviets seconded some of
these anxieties, yet larger concerns rested on the possibility that defection to the West
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would deplete the bloc of young soldiers and valuable military equipment. Thus, for both
the SED and Moscow, the completion of the Wall signaled a positive turn in the
country‟s ability to defend itself.65
The disconnect between the regime and its youth in the matter of remilitarization
surfaced just weeks after the building of the Wall. The Anklam case of September 1961
illustrated specifically youth resistance to the “ever-increasing pressure to undergo
paramilitary training and enlist in the armed forces.”66 On 26 September, a report
detailing the incidents reached the Department of People‟s Education in the ZK. The
culprit consisted of the entire 12b class at the Oberschule in Anklam, who had applied for
the NVA only “after a long discussion.” According to the report, the class had shown
resistance in three instances. On 20 September, the students had refused to sing along to
the song that closed an evening political event. The following day the Volkskammer (or
Parliament) signed a new defense law that granted the SED certain enabling powers to
mobilize its citizens in the event of a “defense emergency.”67 In protest, the students
donned black mourning clothing and decorated the lectern of the school‟s party secretary
with a funeral wreath made from red candy. On 25 September, one of them left a
provoking message on the school‟s chemistry room blackboard, stating, “Freedom,
freedom, we want to be free! Down with your Führer! Up with revolution! Free yourself
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and flee over there [to the West]! Get your own weapons and beat the National People‟s
Army! Long live all former students! Hang the teachers!”
The students involved in the Anklam incident faced relatively mild consequences
for their actions. The two alleged ringleaders were arrested and given prison sentences,
while the other twenty students were either transferred to different schools or expelled
and, after meeting with the district party leadership, were given „work in production‟-type
apprenticeships in hopes that they would come around to service to the state; if they
showed their compliance and repentance, they would be allowed to complete their Abitur,
or final exams. The minutes from this meeting revealed that by and large the parents
agreed with the harsh measures taken. Most, as members of either the party or the
farmers‟ cooperative, sensed the severity of their children‟s actions, and pledged to make
up for their children‟s behavior by performing extra work within their own professions
and in their spare time.68 Despite these acts of atonement, the parents faced the
embarrassing stigma of failed parenting. As for the teachers of the young dissenters, the
consequences were harsher. A more thorough investigation concluded a general flaw
within the system. “Although teachers were generally capable of explaining sensitive
political issues, it was also noted that not enough of them used their initiative to represent
the party line, and that not all studied party materials properly.”69 Some teachers had held
previous posts under the Nazi regime, to which the party deemed them “politically
unreliable.” Additionally, the investigators declared that the FDJ secretary of the Anklam
region had failed to positively reinforce this branch of the SED organization. As a result,
the SED commenced an investigation into all schools across the DDR, examining student
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activity, educator relationships with their pupils, and SED and FDJ organization on the
local levels.70
The Anklam case did little to dissuade the SED from pursuing remilitarization.
Although the SED castigated the Aufrüstung, or rearmament, of the BRD, with the
building of the Wall, the DDR “dramatically increased [its] scope of militarization.” As
the SED refocused efforts on building, rather than maintaining, this military structure, it
took precautions to eliminate further joint resistance. However, this issue illustrates the
tension between ideology and praxis. First, military conscription was implemented in
1962. How could the government justify conscription when it continuously preached
about the evils of Western rearmament? Second, mustering support for the NVA came
through numerous campaigns that depicted West Germans as enemies. In the early 1960s,
the DDR constitution still pledged that there was only one German nationality. Not only
was the demonization of West Germans difficult for many young East Germans on an
ethical level, but it also worked against the SED‟s legal stance on the „nation versus state‟
issue. Third, as was evidenced by other East European militarization, many worried that
an increase in military expenditure would mean cutting funds from other areas of
governmental expense, especially living standards.71 After fifteen years of pursuing a
hardlining, pejorative stance on remilitarization and war, the SED undoubtedly had a
difficult time in rallying support from the masses on this new position.
However, with conscription, in which “all eighteen-year-old males had to submit
to military training and discipline,” the NVA not only filled its ranks with reserves but
also broke the elements of dissent by rigorous physical and ideological training. For the
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eighteen months of basic training, the regime rid itself of “the leather jackets and flat
tops” while imposing physical and psychological punishment, exhaustion and oppression
to obtain unquestioning obedience. “The humiliation and removal of the capacity to make
decisions were part of a process of mortification, which destroyed the old identity in
order to form a new one.” As compulsory service to the state, conscription plunged the
young males of the DDR into active commitment to the state and, as a rite of passage,
into a greater understanding of socialist unity and brotherhood.72
As alluded to in the discussion on the Anklam case, an overlap existed between
membership in the FDJ and the NVA. Reluctance towards re-militarization afflicted
youth in both organizations. For some, this reluctance to support the state without doubt –
mirrored in slogans like, “We‟re pacifists and won‟t carry guns” – proved that the FDJ
was flawed and ineffectual.73 However, the discord between members and non-members
should signal more a flaw against the system rather than the organization. For young men
and women, aged 14-25, the main outreach of the SED was the FDJ.74 Whereas the aims
of the NVA focused on securing physical borders, the FDJ was in charge of securing
ideological ones. Interestingly, membership was not all-inclusive, nor did it ever become
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compulsory.75 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, membership wavered between 40 and 55
percent, a figure that represents the limitations on influence the FDJ faced.76
The functionaries of the FDJ championed the socialist cause in many areas of
society: schools, universities, factories, collective farms, shops, residential areas, the
army and the Stasi. In all these facets, the main responsibility of the youth organization
was to “organize free-time, to steer it in directions compatible with the values the regime
officially espoused: that is, the remarkably traditional and decidedly petit-bourgeois
„socialist morality‟ of 1950s-60s East Germany.”77 One of the most difficult aspects the
FDJ faced in trying to produce this „socialist morality‟ at every aspect of adolescent
existence was the popularity of western culture. Films, music and the „30-pfennig‟ novels
(which included “romances, „wild West‟ adventures and spy stories”) all played into what
the SED and the FDJ termed “western decadence” and Unkultur (the “American lack of
culture”). From the 1950s onward, the FDJ struggled with the pull between droll socialist
ideology and the appeal of popular western culture. To attract youth to the cause was
difficult enough, but to attract them and convince them of the evils of the West
simultaneously proved nearly impossible. Many of the targets of the FDJ also questioned
the motivations of the organization, criticizing the fact that the interest in them personally
usually (and conveniently) revolved around the circulation of petitions or participation in
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demonstrations and political discussions.78 On paper, the FDJ was a leisure organization,
yet its consistent regression to ideological questions and political jargon further distanced
potential members.79
The building of the Wall severed much of the accessibility of Western culture, yet
the repression measured by this construction directly affected FDJ membership. In July
1960, the organization boasted one and half million members throughout the DDR. By
mid-1962, that number had decreased by more than two hundred thousand. In terms of
one age group, 14- 15-year-olds, the percentage dropped from 47.5% to 41.6% in the
same time frame.80 While the FDJ reported an overall increase by fifty thousand in 1961,
the downward fluctuation by the following year illustrates decreasing support and/or
interest in the youth outreach of the SED in the early 1960s. In 1963, Ulbricht distressed
the ineffectiveness of the FDJ, noting that “if the FDJ had already got so far, the issue [of
reform] would have been much simpler.”81
As the SED faced certain opposition to the issue of remilitarization, as depicted in
the Anklam incident, it also faced multiple issues of opposition to the issue of ideology
and the regulation of youth‟s free time. One such incident occurred at the Erweiterte
Oberschule (upper school, or EOS) in Jüterbog in late August 1961. After going to a
camp near the Baltic Sea, a group of students from the EOS fraternized with a group from
the Karl-Marx-Oberschule in Leipzig. After the camp activities of the first day, the two
groups partook in “immoral activities,” such as drinking, dancing and “other
engagements in the tents.” In the fervor of such immorality, they continued to formulate a
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ritual ceremony, in which they collected pictures of Ulbricht and other SED leaders,
stuffed them in a bottle labeled “pigswill” and buried it. During the remainder of the
camp, these two groups continued to meet and mock the party apparatus, from charades
of flag ceremonies typical of FDJ meetings to parodies of Soviet songs and simulations of
Nazi gestures. Such activities were not discovered during the camp, but after the pupils
returned home. A few of the students from both schools continued to meet up, to “drink
and dance to recordings of Bill Haley and Presley,” and it was from these instances that
the camp „rituals‟ were discovered. Once again, the consequences were less harsh on the
students than on the school administration and parents. For not fully recognizing the
severity of the events and for not adopting the correct “party attitude” in the investigation
of the rituals, the director, deputy director and party secretary of the Jüterbog EOS were
all dismissed from their posts.82
Whereas the rigidity of conscription could be thought to weed out the „subversive‟
elements of the male youth, the possibility of eighteen months of ideological
indoctrination for both male and female youth (the FDJ prided itself on being genderneutral) could not be a practical aspiration. Instead, Ulbricht worked to reform the stigma
attached to the FDJ as the united youth organization to one that would be more selective.
By reducing the scope of the FDJ to factory apprentices and students, for example, the
hope would be that the FDJler would come to view their membership not as a duty but as
a state honor.83
Aside from the issue of dissident youth, the debate of nation versus state, or the
German question, also significantly affected how the SED would shape its reformed
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youth policy.84 Efforts of eradicating the „vices of subversion‟ from the West led party
functionaries to propagate a new notion of national distinctness. Though a new phase of
Deutschlandpolitik did not start until 1963, the sentiment of a distinct, progressive East
German national consciousness was mirrored in the FDJ newspaper Junge Welt in April
1962 in letters to the editor on the subject “Are we the better Germans?”: “Yes, I believe
we are the better Germans because we build socialism, which will eventually appertain to
the future of all of Germany. Much of what we have achieved in all these years will also
at some point benefit the West Germans.”85 By addressing individual incidences of
resistance and restructuring the youth ethos by the implementation of a socialist
patriotism, Ulbricht not only opened the door for his “liberal youth interlude,” but also
gained support within the Party for reform.86
At the Sixth Party Congress in January 1963, the SED formally adopted a new
position that redirected its energies onto the national question, rather that concerning
itself with the role the DDR played in the realm of international socialism. Step by step,
the Ulbricht administration eliminated each all-German element from the official state
ideology. In addition, every instance of détente in East-West relations contributed to the
solidification of the status quo and the further avoidance in pursuing reunification.87 With
this official division came the need to disseminate the differences between East and West
throughout the population. As “patriots and internationalists,” it was vital that the youth
understand the ideological construction of the Kulturnation, and not become persuaded
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by the „virus of subversion‟ of the West.88 Drawing on this nineteenth-century construct,
the SED worked to forge a new national consciousness, one that would show the DDR
and the world that socialism produced a „better‟ German. In identifying the differences
between itself and its capitalist neighbor, the SED made two different (yet both
problematic) nationalist claims. The first “simply absorbed nation into class,” meaning
that the proletariat were the true heirs to the German nation based on their long struggle
against capitalism. However, East German society was not cohesive or classless; in fact,
it continued to diversify throughout the span of the socialist regime. The second, which
ran somewhat contradictory to the first, “sought to connect the identity of the DDR not
specifically to the heroic progressive tradition, but to certain values and ideas
[productivity, thrift, discipline and morality] long condemned in party circles as
representative of „bourgeois‟ culture.” Not only did this strain fall out of line with true
Marxist-Leninist progressivism, but the values it preached also had a striking similarity to
the tone of West German society.89 Because of these complications, Ulbricht worked
relentlessly to define a socialist patriotic consciousness through the rhetoric of
revolutionary and reactionary. The „better‟ German would not be swayed by the Western,
“reactionaries,” the “historically surviving classes [who fought] against socialist
progressivism, against revolutionary societal modifications and against the acts of the
progressive and revolutionary classes.”90
In order to propagate this new stance, Ulbricht officially initiated his liberalization
movement with the second Jugendkommuniqué in September 1963. (The first
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Jugendkommuniqué was issued by Ulbricht in 1961, yet it proved to be impractical due
to the tensions between youth and the state examined in the discussion of the NVA and
the FDJ.) The slogan of this Jugendkommuniqué, “Youth of today, Masters of tomorrow
– Give youth trust and responsibility,”91 outwardly pledged a cultural thaw in the DDR.
Aiming to open dialogue between the youth and the government, this “opening” has been
a source of discussion amongst historians. In the spirit of reform, Ulrich Mählert and
Alan McDougall argue that the Jugendkommuniqué began in earnest. Mählert notes that
the far-reaching concept sprung from the Politbüro meeting on 7 February 1961, where
Jugendkommission leader Kurt Turba stressed the importance of a relationship with the
youth that was not based on “spoon-feeding, finger-waving and administration.” As a
result, the Jugendkommuniqué touted tolerance and the attention on youth individuality
and privacy.92 McDougall attributes the NÖS and the shortcomings of the FDJ as other
factors that influenced the need to “clear the path for young people.” Had the FDJ been as
successful as projected in paving the way for reform, the NÖS would not have had to
been “flanked a liberal youth policy.” In 1963, Ulbricht‟s attitude on an all-inclusive FDJ
had changed. Instead of “wanting to concentrate all youth work in the FDJ,” he now
supported the idea that the FDJ should become more of an organization for “factory
apprentices, school pupils, and university students.”93
Ulbricht‟s motivations, however, are often criticized. Marc-Dietrich Ohse shies
away from terming this open policy as an effort of liberalization, favoring instead the use
of „flexibility‟ to characterize the reforms of the Jugendkommuniqué.94 Mark Fenemore,
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a harsher critic, finds that reform to the SED was one of false hope. “Ulbricht‟s actual
statements in March 1963 make it clear that he had no intention of unleashing creativity
in the cultural sphere. What he wanted was for young people to form a modern, capable
workforce and for the education system to achieve this function. What he absolutely did
not want were teachers „who have succumbed to the influence of Western influences‟ or
TV programmes designed to develop young people‟s fashion sense. To liberals and
reformers within the administration, the rhetoric about ending „contradictions‟ and
„bureaucracy‟ appeared to signal that the regime was now aware of the need for change.
What Ulbricht had intended was precisely the opposite: a return to traditional values.”95
Questions of Ulbricht‟s personal intentions with this new, liberal policy originated
within the ranks of the SED, however. Though Ulbricht had the support of Kurt Turba
and the Jugendkommission, other “old functionaries” like Horst Schumann, the leader of
the FDJ, and Erich Honecker were less enthusiastic about the project. Before the Wall,
Schumann had criticized “spoon-feeding” the youth and warned the SED against the
intensification of a political-ideological child-rearing, which would only produce
“Doppelzüngler.”96 Honecker, on the other hand, led the opposition based on both
generational and party lines. As part of the reform process, Ulbricht decided that he
needed younger faces and minds, “with fresher ideas and less power.”97 This distinct
divide between older and newer party functionaries not only created a rift within the
SED, but it also made the older generation question the amount of power placed in the
hands of the youth. Some had difficulty in dealing with the seemingly uncomfortable
questions and self-critical assessments posed by their younger counterparts, while other
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refused to adhere to the new youth policy past lip-service.98 Though Honecker personally
became known for his openness of youth policy after he took office in 1971, in the 1960s
he did not display such tolerance. In fact, despite the issues with the youth, he did not feel
that restructuring either youth policy or the FDJ was necessary. In this vein of
conservatism, he and others divided the party on the idea of reforming youth policy not
along generational lines but more so along ideological ones. Kurt Hager purportedly
lamented the drastic reforms, saying “never forget, Ulbricht is not the Politburo [sic]!”
These generational and ideological sentiments consolidated party opposition against
Ulbricht and his “manifesto of socialist youth policy.”99
What remains incontestable about the Jugendkommuniqué is that, despite the
difference between theory and practice, between dissonant opinions within the SED, it
successfully initiated a new era of youth policy, in particular, one that invited the youth
into actively shaping the future of the DDR. The SED produced two documents on the
Jugendkommuniqué. The first, titled “Trust and Responsibility to the Youth” was the
product of the Politbüro meeting on 17 September 1963. Printed in part four days later in
the party‟s newspaper Neues Deutschland, this document had been composed, at the
bequest of Ulbricht, by three journalists: Kurt Turba, Harald Wessel, and Heinz Nahke.
Ulbricht selected these men, rather than the usual party agents, in order “to promote
„impudent socialism‟: the idea that the SED dictatorship could be radically reformed by
allowing young people greater initiative and more room to criticize the status quo.”100 In
challenging the status quo, the document directly addresses the generational rift cutting
lines through the party. “In the DDR there are many older people who trust, who
98
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understand and help the youth. Many older citizens of the DDR, however, still eye the
youth with anxiety and a certain mistrust. Despite this, they know that our youth is
different from the youth of West Germany. However, they believe our girls and boys will
not be able to measure up to the high requirements that the building of socialism
requires.” The SED, though, “has nothing in common with those who mistrust our
youth.”101
The second document, whose title shared the slogan of the Jugendkommuniqué
(“Youth of today – Masters of tomorrow”), printed the “Trust and Responsibility to the
Youth” alongside the speech Ulbricht delivered at the mass rally of the youth in Berlin on
23 September. Reiterating the assertions of “Trust and Responsibility to the Youth”, in
terms of supporting youth participation in state policy, “You are the forgers of the
German future” outlined what the state expected of its revolutionary youth. In order to
forge the future of socialism, for example, students, both male and female, must be
productive in their school lessons, be healthy in mind, body, and character, and dedicate
themselves to the technical revolution. In his closing remarks, Ulbricht called on all of
society, regardless of age, to collaborate for the betterment of the socialist republic. “My
appeal to all young friends, to all young women, to all citizens of the DDR, to all parents,
to all pedagogues: Dear friends, trust in the Jugendkommuniqué of the Politbüro! Openly
tackle the problems that face the people! Straighten out these questions! Think about
them. How can we better direct this work? Work trustfully with the youth! And you, dear
young friends, unfurl your enthusiasm and all your inner strength, with which the great
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aims that we have set out in the program of socialism, will be bravely and purposefully
realized. In these terms I salute you. Friendship!”102
The Jugendkommuniqué was a double-edged sword. While it could be
appreciated for accepting the realities surrounding problems of youth and youth policy
and attempting to groom the next generation of socialists, its flaws would be detrimental
to the system. Not only did it consolidate many of the anti-reformers within the SED,
who spent the next two years trying to undermine it, but it also presented a multitude of
problems for the FDJ. As with other party functionaries, the FDJ gave public lip service
to the legislation, yet the “Trust and Responsibility to the Youth” tested the validity of the
youth organization. The document‟s wording did not criticize the FDJ by name, but it
cited the problems with all previous youth work, and its principles, including the
directives to focus FDJ work on the age group of 14- to 22-year-old, cooperate regularly
with other youth organizations, and increase toleration on aspects of youth life,
jeopardized the FDJ position as the leading youth authority. In effect, “the FDJ leadership
found itself, consciously or unconsciously, trying to pursue two mutually antagonistic
concepts of youth policy.”103
The Jugendgesetz, enacted on 4 May 1964 (fully, the “Law on the Participation of
the Youth of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik in the Struggle for the
Comprehensive Construction of Socialism and the General Support of Its Initiatives by
the Leadership of the National Economy and the State, in Occupation and School, in
Culture and Sportˮ), signaled the formal adoption of Ulbricht‟s platform of student
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inclusion in shaping the future of socialism. Opening with the statement that, “In the
DDR the state and the young generation for the first time in German history have
common interests and goals,ˮ the law was built off the existing “Law of 8 February 1950
on the Participation of the Youth in the Construction of the Deutsche Demokratische
Republik and the Support of the Youth in School and Occupation, in Sport and
Recreation”, which established the basic rights of the younger generation. By its
reconstruction, it had been acknowledged that the previous law from 1950 “is in our life
fully and completely realized.”104
The law sought to fully incorporate the youth into the socialism, and to account
for dissonance between youth, culture and the regime, assigned each of its five parts with
a responsibility particular to the issue at hand. The first, “The Younger Generation of the
Deutsche Demokratische Republik and the Future of Germany,” grounded the role of the
DDR and the youth in the building of socialism and the reunification of Germany under
its auspices. Aside from pledging the pillars on which socialism, and therefore the DDR,
was built – namely, peace and social security, human dignity and brotherhood, freedom
and justice, humanity and zest for life – this section of the law also expounded the
meaning of the socialist youth policy. In the spirit of the second Jugendkommuniqué, it
was comprised of six aspects: to support the independent thoughts and actions of the
youth in all areas of communal life, as well as to support them comradely through any
difficulties; to transfer the knowledge and abilities of the youth to higher responsibilities
in work, study, instruction, and research, and cultivate these abilities for the socialist
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teamwork; to guarantee the active cooperation of the leadership of the state and the
national economy; to help the youth in the construction of an interesting, spiritually
meaningful, cultural and athletic life; to support every effort of the youth to obtain a
moral quality, that is in accordance with the socialist concept of man and a healthy way
of life; and to shape the relationships between young women and men as well as between
old and young on the basis of humanly recognition and respect and the principle of equal
rights.105
The second and third sections encompassed the changes in the two respective
paths open to young people – work and school. “The Participation of the Youth in the
Development of the National Economy” granted a certain amount of responsibility of the
youth toward the progress of the state. In response to lagging membership in youth
organizations, particularly the FDJ, Article 3 noted that the movement toward personal
involvement in the state must be through the vehicle of youth brigades, sectors and
collectives. Therefore, a greater emphasis was placed on the role of the youth in the
production sector of society, where the FDJ and the FDGB (Freier Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund, or League of Free German Trade Unions) carried out the important
tasks allotted to them by the organ of the state economy. In “The Education and
Qualification of the Young Generation”, the law first of all established the equality of the
socialist education system, a system which focused on cultivating not just the minds of
the young but also their spiritual, moral and physical well-being. With the investment of a
complex education system, the state pledged the support of its teachers and the
professional advancement of students, and summarized the path to success (which, of
course, stems from the initial involvement with the FDJ and the Ernst Thälmann
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Pioniere). Both of these sections plotted out the role of the youth in building socialism,
either through production or specialized professions, both of which interestingly focus on
the participation in youth organizations.
The task of the fourth section of this law was to confront the issue of cultural
subversion while simultaneously urging a cultural thaw. “The Development of a Healthy,
Culturally-Rich and Joyful (Lebensfroh) Generation” addressed first the role of the
Ministerium für Kultur (Ministry of Culture, or MfK) in pursuing the dissemination of
socialist-reality art, books, and music.106 The emphasis on this role of the MfK sprung
from the interest that “in books, films, theatre, compositions, works of art, in radio and
TV programs, and in the press are where the present problems of the youth originate.”107
The second role of this passage in the law rested with the physical health, encouraged by
physical fitness at every age level, regardless of school, work, or recreation, and “moral”
fitness of the youth. Article 32 warned against the consequences of nicotine and alcohol
abuse, in particular, charging the Ministry of Health (MfG) and the Ministry of National
Education (MfV) with forming health programs and campaigns and working with the
schools to implement them.108
The fifth and final section of this law (aside from the concluding remarks which
technically count as the final section), “The Cooperation of the Youth with the
Leadership of the State and the Responsibility of the State and Economic Committees for
the Realization of the Tenets of the Socialist Youth Policy,” then acted as a binding
contract between the state and its youth. While Ulbricht achieved the passing of new
youth policy legislation, the wording throughout this document illustrates that this liberal
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process of reform would not be long-lasting. The bulk of the document centers on the
ideological basis and the organization of the youth policy, particularly child-rearing,
education, and training, rather than culture and free time. 109 This emphasis away from the
responsibilities of the FDJ alludes to inner rift in the party. Though Ulbricht successfully
pushed the new youth legislation, it came without explicit reforming of the FDJ, which
the anti-reformers were against.
At the chagrin of the anti-reformers, just weeks after the passing of the
Jugendgesetz, Ulbricht warmly greeted the crowd of young students from the BRD and
DDR who had traveled to Berlin to partake in the Deutschlandtreffen. In the vein of
reform and continued de-Stalinization, Ulbricht had shifted his focus of internal
engagement to one that promoted the DDR as the model for socialist states.110 This
became most evident in the display of “his” youth at the Deutschlandtreffen, a festival
that promised “socialism would then convince the postwar children that alternative
experiences and possibilities were no longer available or necessary.”111 What this festival
also attempted to evidence, through the display of successful, united socialist students,
was that the SED had conquered the difficult questions of youth and of nationality.
Before analyzing the successes and failures of the Deutschlandtreffen, however, it is
necessary to further examination the interplay between youth and nationalism and the
politics that lead to this display of socialist culture.
In his speech at the closing rally of the Deutschlandtreffen, West German student
Fritz Meinicke declared, “Yes, we have witnessed that the DDR is really a state of
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youth.”112 Given Ulbricht‟s drive in reforming youth policy and his particular focus on
projecting the national vigor of the East German youth, this claim would be the ideal
reaction. Based on the constraints imposed on the youth and Volksbildung by the State
though the Jugendgesetz, could this assertion, that the DDR is a state of youth, hold any
real bearing? Considering the split in the Party over the issues presented in the
Jugendkommuniqué and youth law, how successful could the Deutschlandtreffen have
been in pursuing the liberalization of socialism that Ulbricht so desperately pursued?
More importantly, what did the SED hope to project in fostering dialogue between the
capitalist and socialist sects of the same nation?
The Deutschlandtreffen der Jugend 1964, while culturally and politically
significant in its time and place, was not the first of its kind. The idea of East/West
student congregation, particularly with the goal of cultural exchange with international
magnitude, originated with the Weltfestspiele or international student games, sponsored
by the Communist-led World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International
Union of Students. These festivals, held at two- to three-year intervals starting with the
first in Prague 1947, featured numerous cultural attractions such as films, sports,
excursions lectures, and discussions, and proposed to “bring together young people from
all over the world in a spirit of friendship and co-operation and thus to strengthen world
peace.”113 World peace, of course, on Soviet terms meant that Western involvement was
heavily monitored, but it was not prohibited. With each festival, organization,
governmental support (financial and political), and international attention on the role of
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student continued to rise. By 1951, in the World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace
in Berlin, the FDJ had not only secured government sanction and subsidies, local
housing, and facilities for the event, but had also drawn record numbers. Although
notable international delegates came from China and Korea to promote the “Movement to
Resist America and Aid Korea” (while Yugoslavia and Spain were refused entry for
political reasons), the most boasted participation was interestingly that of the West
Germans, of whom an astonishing 100,000 were projected to attend.114
This fixation on the German question continued to guide the SED in future
attempts of aligning its youth with party policy on the national question. Throughout the
1950s, the Party sanctioned two different strains of inter-German student dialogue. The
first consisted of annual Kulturtagungen. The other, the first of which in many ways
served as “a rehearsal for the [World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace],”115 was
the Deutschlandtreffen. Scheduled around the Pentecost weekend festivities of 1950,
1954 and 1964, the first of these had long-lasting effects. “Even though for the majority
the diverse cultural program constituted the attraction of the meeting, the Party leadership
rated– as did the West German viewers – above all the thoroughly planned and organized
the final demonstration as a sign of approval of the youth on the policies of the SED. It
was not just the usual propaganda cliché, as President Wilhelm Pieck openly announced
shortly thereafter that the youth would be a part of the population that would find a vast
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amount of support from the SED. And it was also no coincidence that the Politbüro
initiated its ideological offensive on the last day of the Deutschlandtreffen.ˮ116
How can the Deutschlandtreffen of 1964 be interpreted apart from just another
iteration of the international display of peace, socialism and inter-German dialogue? To a
large extent, this third meeting of East and West German students, which took place 16
through 18 May 1964, mirrored the efforts of the previous inter-German festivals.
Amongst the “sun, sex and socialism,”117 students from the DDR and the BRD118 partook
in sporting activities, attended cultural events at the numerous theatres and cinemas,
listened to book readings from authors like Brigitte Reimann, Christa Wolf, Hermann
Kant and Dieter Noll, and danced the night away to jazz and rock „n‟ roll.119 Perhaps
most significant, however, were the discussions on the differences between the two
German regimes and the national question of the DDR. A particularly recurrent theme,
captured in literature like Berlin – Sonnenseite and Die Jungen haben das Wort, was the
validity of the DDR not just as a state, but as the better state. “Is it Berlin? There is Berlin
and then there is another, which the Wall that we have built runs through, and on the one
side of the Wall live people like you and I, yet on the other side there are people who

116

Peter Skyba, “Massenorganisation ohne Massen. Jugendpolitik, Militarisierung und das Scheitern der
FDJˮ in Dierk Hoffmann, Michael Schwartz, Hermann Wentker (Hrsg.), Vor dem Mauerbau: Politik und
Gesellschaft in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003), 242.
117
Hermann Schreiber, “Sonne, Sex und Sozialismus,ˮ Der Spiegel 22 (27 May 1964): 33-7.
118
Most sources only reference the number of West German participants (25,000) and do not denote the
social organizations that they belonged to. Neues Deutschland 19/128 (8 May 1964): 1, stated that Horst
Schumann, president of the Festkomitee, extended the invitation to leaders of 13 West German
Jugendverbände, yet the only one mentioned is the SDS (Socialist German Student Union). The lack of
greater participation on behalf of the SDS (which because of certain conditions only sent three delegates:
Helmut Lessing, Jochen Noth and Urs Müller) is detailed in ND 19/135 (17 May 1964): 2. Kirsch, Kirsch,
Berlin-Sonnenseite – Deutschlandtreffen der Jugend in der Hauptstadt der DDR Berlin 1964 (Berlin:
Verlag Neues Leben, 1967), 150, confirm this limited participation, listing Hager as the official
representative of the SDS at the student forum on the last day of the festival.
119
Mählert, Stephan, Blaue Hemden – rote Fahnen, 155.

51
have the power and the money and say that the DDR does not exist.”120 The two previous
Deutschlandtreffen had attempted to unite all German youth with the intent of eventual
reunification under socialist terms. By 1964, the idea of two separate Germanys, based
not just on statehood but also on nationhood, had found ample footing within the
direction of SED policy. For Ulbricht, this Deutschlandtreffen would serve two purposes.
To its visitors from West Germany, it would display the success of the DDR as a state.
To the dissenters within the Party, it would also justify the philosophy of the
Jugendkommuniqué while acknowledging the effectiveness of the FDJ in rallying the
youth, domestically and internationally, to the cause of socialism.121
The fact that the party provided extensive coverage of the Deutschlandtreffen
through multiple media evidences that this festival was unlike any other. With the
attitude, “If you can‟t beat the new beat, then dance to the music,” the party sanctioned
the playing of rock „n‟ roll music and dancing, yet on its terms. 122 To counteract the
Western, “ideologically subversive” airwaves of RIAS (Radio in the American Sector),
NWDR (Northwest German Radio) and Freies Berlin (Free Berlin), it produced its own
radio station, aptly named Deutschlandtreffen 64 (or DT 64), to provide entertainment for
the 535,000 at the festival and the thousands of other youth who had not made it to
Berlin.123 For youth, DT 64, the “new, wonderful” station, “brought hot music” and
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“reports of places one could not be.”124 For the party, it gave the hope that, “In the future,
people in the DDR will seldom sing western rock music. Rather, in both German states,
they will sing rock music from the DDR, with texts that correspond to our lives and
feelings.”125
In addition to these continuous broadcasts, Neues Deutschland extensively
covered events and ideas from the view of participants and party apparatchiks. The
newspaper highlighted remarks from West German students about the importance of the
festival, specifically that “West German youth should also do something like this” and
“West Berliners should not stay on one side.” Additionally, Ulbricht addressed the youth
on the cover page each day, reiterating his reformed persona as a “wise and good father.”
On 15 May, for example, he warmly welcomed the West German visitors, stating “We
are very pleased that in these next few days you will join us to promote peace, détente,
humanity and real freedom. From the bottom of our hearts we support these festivities of
the German youth, because they are festivities of all good Germans, whose feelings and
minds remain young.” Additionally, ads emphasized cultural elements like the
“Pfingstlied der Jugend” and depictions of a domestic, welcoming East German populace
(“Well prepared” for the accommodation of its guests).
However, the main function of ND‟s coverage was to draw attention to the interGerman dialogue and the „success‟ of the DDR in promoting socialism. Pictures of
East/West fraternization with captions like, “Germany‟s youth want this future!”,
complemented articles like “Young Socialists built tomorrow while West Germany is still
in yesterday” and “Young West Germans experience the DDR and a growing interest for
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our Jugendgesetz,” which attacked the Bonn government for refusing to restructure its
own youth policy. Perhaps more damning was its publication of an RIAS interview
between BRD Vice Chancellor Erich Mende and West German youth, in which Mende
skirted the issues of reunification and negotiations on traveling permits. The article
strategically placed under another one with the large-print caption “Walter Ulbricht: I
take you all by the hand” blatantly painted Mende as an inadequate governmental figure,
and in the text, even likened him to Goebbels.126
As the central organ of the SED, the role of ND was to disseminate ideology and
maintain the official party line. According to its pages, the Deutschlandtreffen was
nothing short of a success. Despite minor scuffles, no grand gesture of protest had either
hindered the festival or resulted thereafter, and the large attendance showed that three
years after the building of the Wall, the majority of East German youth stood loyal to the
regime.127 Additionally, “The GDR had been able to present an open-minded and tolerant
face to the world.”128 The desired depiction of the DDR as a flourishing socialist state,
and “ein Staat der Jugend,” had been accomplished.
Despite these small successes, the festival had not solved the inner-party struggle
or problems with youth policy. As an outreach of the Jugendkommuniqué, the
Deutschlandtreffen reheated the tensions of shaping youth policy and the party platform
continued to be riddled with contradictions.129 In June 1964, the Politbüro issued a report
on the “Problems revealed in the assessment of the Deutschlandtreffen.” While it
mentioned some positive accomplishments, like the fact that it showed that East German
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youth had a healthy relationship with their state, the report also unveiled the
repercussions of hosting such an open, liberal, and modern event. One problem in
particular arose from the cultural component of the festival. The integration and emphasis
of culture at the Deutschlandtreffen “proved that the new oeuvre of authors, lyricists,
sculptors, painters, the muse of serious and clear ensembles and soloists, is increasingly
becoming a component of the lives of the youth.”130 The problems of influences on the
youth by the cultural intelligentsia, which will be examined in further length in the
discussion on the Eleventh Plenum in Chapter Two, presented just one issue with culture.
The other aspect that worried SED members was the cultural exchange between East and
West and how that changed the meaning of modern from what the party envisioned. The
adoption of the beat music, fashion and haircuts of the West created a crisis for the
Jugendkommuniqué. Instead of utilizing the loosened constraints for building socialism,
the majority of the youth were “misspending it in the „mania‟ surrounding the Beatles.”
Even Ulbricht had to ask himself, “How far could socialism modernize without
converging with the West?”131
In the three short years from the sealing of the borders to the Deutschlandtreffen,
Ulbricht had accomplished a great deal under his reforming zeal. Though the interGerman youth festival presented more problems than answers in shaping youth policy
and fighting “Western subversion,” it had also shown a decent amount of progress. The
hundreds of thousands of youth that had participated did not come to Karl-Marx-Platz to
riot against conscription or remilitarization, nor had they haphazardly been rounded up by
the FDJ to fill quotas. They participated with a new sense of national consciousness,
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cultural importance, and, for the most part, in the name of socialism. In the WalterUlbricht-Stadium, Ulbricht posed a series of questions that cheered these achievements.
To both “I ask the youth from the whole of Germany: do you agree with this future?” and
“I ask the youth from the whole of Germany: should the people in charge in both German
states speak with one another, yes or no?” he received a resounding, “thousand-fold
yes.”132
The problem of culture, however, clouded the positive results of the “liberal youth
interlude.” For Ulbricht, the Deutschlandtreffen signaled the culmination of the strides
taken to achieve the principles of the Jugendkommuniqué. Culture was an element that
could draw in support for the party and help with shaping a new socialist national
identity. For the anti-reformers, though, this festival presented an opportunity to show the
dangers of liberalism. Both popular culture and the intelligentsia worked against the
regime and thus needed to be controlled. “When the opening towards youth subculture
was no longer deemed a success, the only remaining solution was to crack down
again.”133
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CHAPTER TWO
Reversing the Thaw: The “Kahlschlag” Plenum and Solving the Crisis of Culture

Though the Deutschlandtreffen was considered a success in producing the image
of the DDR as “a state of youth” and in propagating the DDR as the “better Germany,” it
also drew criticisms from within the party. The cultural exchanges allowed at the festival
gave many youth the hope that once it was over, the same liberties, such as freer music,
the ability to address previous taboos, and pushing the boundaries of literature and film,
would remain intact. The anti-reformers, however, viewed the continuation of such
liberties as sowing the seeds of “impudent socialism.”134 Though beat music, the
exemplary model of American Unkultur, was the foremost protagonist in challenging the
regime in rhetoric and legitimacy, the anti-reformers found enemies in all spheres of
culture. In pursuing a national consciousness separate from the West, many within the
ranks of the SED realized the dangers in allowing the continued infiltration of Western
music, criticisms of the regime (particularly by those who had fled to the West), and the
discussion of topics that went against the moral ethics of the new socialist man. From pop
culture to cultural intellectualism, the party stressed that, “Our concerns are that socialist
culture becomes the culture of the people, a solid component of life, emotions, thoughts
and actions.”135
This chapter examines the role of national consciousness in socialist culture. The
focus on a German national identity not only provoked issues of discontent based on the
constant comparisons with the other German nation, but it also the divided the party due
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to the lack of commitment to a culture more in line with proletarian internationalism.
This division culminated in the renowned Eleventh Plenum of the ZK, a turning point in
party policy and power structure. On 18 December, 1965, Ulbricht opened his closing
statement at the plenum with a sense of accomplishment. “Comrades! This plenum of the
Zentralkomitee has fulfilled an important mission. It has guided and completed the
development of the socialist social order of the DDR until 1970 and has particularly laid
out in detail the problems and issues in the second step of the NÖS, the problems of the
practical development of democracy in our state, the development of national education
and culture. The most important thing is that all these problems be worked out, discussed,
and solved.”136 The head of state had presided over the three-day plenum, yet, in many
ways, this closing statement signaled not only the beginning of the end for his reform
platform but also his reign. Erich Honecker, with the support of the anti-reformers
(particularly Hager) and the Kremlin, initiated the plenum by launching specific,
significant attacks on culture and economics.137 Termed “Kahlschlag,” literally “clearcutting,” this plenum initiated the rise of the anti-reformers‟ conservatism, and with its
restrictions on culture, ushered in a new phase of youth policy.
Before examining the Eleventh Plenum and its consequences on youth policy (and
subsequently the shift in the concept of national consciousness), it is necessary to first
observe the plenum as a culmination of conservative strides in relation to the topic of
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national culture. Though the Kahlschlag Plenum was predominantly a forum for antireformers to “reimpose their hegemony in matters of culture and the arts,”138 from the
founding of the DDR, the role of culture and what it meant for national identity conflicted
the SED as a whole. This is evidenced in the reactions of Honecker and Hager towards
the cultural displays at the Deutschlandtreffen. Though they did not condone the
emphasis on an all-German culture, they nonetheless recognized the importance of
aligning the cultural sphere with socialist policy, particularly in the construction of the
socialist patriotic identity.
Because the German interpretation of nation, or Volk, held connotations of blood
ties, the construction of an East German identity completely separate from their Western
counterparts could not be achieved solely through the pursuit of socialist patriotism, as
evidenced in the Deutschlandtreffen. While the rhetoric of the “better Germany” surfaced
in the 1960s, the attempts to create this persona through culture started in the previous
decade. In the 1950s, the SED pursued a Nationalkultur that would not only trump the
high culture generally associated with West Germany, but would also prove that the DDR
was the rightful heir of the German classical Kulturerbe, or cultural heritage.
Commemorations devoted to the Classicists, like public venerations of Goethe, Schiller,
and Bach, consumed governmental focus, energy and expenditures to evidence that the
framework for Marxist-Leninist ideology and socialist realism indeed had deep cultural
roots within the eastern sphere of German national history.139 The building of the Berlin
Wall did not stop this propagandistic usage of the classics, but it “gradually diffused
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Kultur without diminishing its importance.”140 In other words, the classics became
integral parts of socialist upbringing, like themes in schoolbooks, literary reiterations, and
cultural excursions.141 The culture sphere of the 1960s, however, did not revolve around
the classics, and the rebellion against constraints on youth culture could not be solved by
DEFA (Deutsche Film AG) fairy-tale films or SED versions of the Twist. In a decade in
which the SED proclaimed the DDR to be “ein Staat der Jugend,” the party increasingly
had to adapt its cultural policy to counteract the popular culture challenged its socialist
identity.
Alexander Stephan has identified four phases of cultural policy in the DDR: the
anti-fascist/democratic phase (1943-1949/50), the transition to the socialist cultural
revolution (1949/50-1956), the socialist cultural revolution (1956-1961) and the national
period (1961-1989). In this last phase, culture and politics became inseparable. Politics
summarily consisted of the “all-encompassing construction of socialism,” a direction that
culture reflected with its “construction of a socialist national literature and people‟s
culture.”142 While Stephan specifically analyzes the role of Johannes R. Becher, Minister
of Culture from 1954-1958, in implementing cultural policy throughout the other three
stages of DDR history, his identification of cultural policy as an expression of class
consciousness, and thus an indicator of the progress of socialist society, helps to clarify
the anti-reformers‟ criticisms of the cultural sphere as well as their simultaneous attacks
on youth policy in the 1960s.
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The two important stages that precede the national period in which this thesis is
centered are the transition to the socialist cultural revolution (1949/50-1956) and the
socialist cultural revolution (1956-1961). Each of these periods is marked by a cycle of
“reform, crisis and cultural outreach,” a cycle which surfaces once again with the
Kahlschlag Plenum. This is important because both Honecker and Hager were involved
in the ZK throughout the 1950s and worked extensively on issues related to culture and
youth. Honecker was heavily involved in the structuring of the FDJ and, more notably,
attended the Twentieth Congress of the KPdSU in Moscow, which stimulated not only
conversations of de-Stalinization but also criticisms of SED policy. Hager, who became
the ZK Secretary of Science and Culture in 1955, scrutinized the lack of culture
functionaries who would stand up against the revisionists,143 a group who, like Anton
Ackermann, sought German socialism through another way.144
In the period of transition to the socialist cultural revolution, the reform faction in
the Politbüro was not initially led by Ulbricht but, in the spirit of revisionism displayed in
the case Tito‟s Yugoslavia, against him. The uprising of 17 June 1953, in which protest
spread from one against poor working conditions to one that encompassed the struggle
for democratization and unification, damaged the revisionist strain. With the aid of
Moscow, who could not afford to lose the DDR in its power struggle against the West,
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political hardliners ably secured Ulbricht‟s place as head of state.145 President Otto
Grotewohl, however, faced continued dissent within the cultural sphere. In October 1953,
he entered negotiations with creative artists about the newly-formed art commission and
the direction of the Neue Kurs, or new course. Defending the success of the commission,
Grotewohl stubbornly refused the new period marked by Stalin‟s death to become one of
„lazy liberalism‟. Instead, he welcomed the official party line on culture and the need to
have it sanctioned through the state by founding the Ministerium für Kultur (Ministry of
Culture, or MfK) on 7 January 1954. Under the leadership of newly-appointed Minister
of Culture, poet Johannes R. Becher, the MfK sought to “defend a unified German
culture,” and with the completion of the Fourth Party Congress in April 1954, the SED
further explicated the “meaning [of our republic] as the basis for the all-German
Volksbewegung for national unity and a democratic peace treaty.”146
This pursuit for a unified German culture shifted with the admission of the DDR
into the Warsaw Pact in 1955, a move that “allowed the SED to downplay German unity
by proclaiming its „two state theory‟ which stated that unification could be achieved only
on the basis of the GDR‟s „socialist achievements‟.”147 With the backing of its socialist
neighbors and the distancing of the idea of unification, the DDR entered a new cultural
phase, one that had completed the transition to socialist cultural revolution and now
worked to define itself in purely socialist terms. As previously mentioned, Ulbricht took
the opportunity at the Fifth FDJ Parliament in May 1955 to project his reform platform,
yet unrest with other Warsaw Pact members in 1956 presented the next cycle of crisis.
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The Hungarian Crisis of 1956 negatively affected Ulbricht‟s validity within the push to
reform. To ensure the protest in Budapest would not present another 17 June, on October
24, 1956, as Imre Nagy took power, Ulbricht organized hour-long discussions between
party functionaries and Berlin‟s university students on the importance of respecting the
state, particularly since, as SED Secretary Alfred Neumann stated, the students lived off
the stipendiums provided by the people.148 Though the NVA forces did not participate in
quieting the unrest in Hungary, Ulbricht, out of loyalty to the Soviets and fear of another
protest on DDR soil, supported the Kremlin‟s actions.
Ulbricht‟s response to the protest crises of 1956 drew criticisms both from the
BRD and within his own borders. The volume of public outrage from the DDR came
from cultural figures like Christa Wolf and Wolf Biermann, who, although convinced
socialists, openly voiced disapproval of the SED leader‟s solidarity with the KPdSU.
However, another faction, the “counterrevolutionary conspiracy” of the Harich-Gruppe,
drew more attention. One of the most renowned instances that caused distress between
the intellectual sphere and the party, this group, led by journalist and professor of
philosophy Wolfgang Harich, allegedly aimed to subvert the SED by initiating
discussions with West German intellectuals on the topic of German reunification through
a “third way.”149 Calling for the removal of Ulbricht, reunification with the BRD as a
neutral and unarmed state, free elections, and alignment with the SPD, among other
reforms, this group of intellectual Marxists was targeted by the state as a
counterrevolutionary movement. After arresting those involved, the party published a
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series of defamatory articles in ND and Sonntag, making every effort to sever any sort of
popular support.150 Between the two show trials of March and July 1957, Harich, along
with Bernhard Steinberger, Walter Janka, Gustav Just, Richard Wolf, Heinz Zöger and
Manfred Hertwig were denounced as enemies of the state and sentenced to prison
terms.151 Through these events, the MfK faced the challenge of repairing the identity
crisis produced by the party line that officially trumped what remained of all-German
cultural aspirations.152
This identity crisis led the SED to once again turn focus toward the cultural
sphere. Walter Ulbricht wanted to overcome the separation of art and life, believing that
one could achieve culture like politics and economics. “In the areas of state and economy
the worker class of the DDR is already the master. Now it must also storm the heights of
culture and possess it.”153 As a result, the SED responded to the identity crisis by passing
its new platform on culture in 1959, termed the Bitterfelder Weg. This approach, rooted
in socialist realism, worked to promote workers‟ culture with the aims of the SED “to
bring the arts further into line with Party policy and to promote forms of culture which
would stimulate material productivity.” Under Ulbricht‟s reform movement at the start of
the national period, the Bitterfelder Weg seemed to be a success. Despite his political
conflict with Ulbricht, Honecker acknowledged the importance of this cultural policy in
the shaping of the socialist nationalist consciousness, recalling in the official history of
the SED published in 1978 that, “[in 1962] the socialist German national culture began to
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develop. This was also the foundation of the emerging socialist German nation in the
GDR.”154
In the early years of the national period, Ulbricht‟s reform platform eschewed any
debilitating crises that mimicked those of the previous decade. Stability within the bloc
alongside a revamped economy and a renewed youth policy made it difficult for the antireformers to gain momentum. However, because intellectuals played a major role in the
creation of a national consciousness, there were two flaws within the cultural sphere that
Honecker and Hager were able to exploit. The first was the two-sidedness of
liberalization. Taking advantage of the relaxation of state control, some writers and artists
ardently participated in the formation of a socialist national identity that would replace
the legacy of a unified German culture. Yet this liberalization also enticed others,
particularly directors of the “Kaninchen” films, to voice their acerbic individual opinions,
especially on the role of youth in the DDR, and to incite conversations about flaws with
the system.155 The second issue of the Bitterfelder Weg the anti-reformers criticized was
the influence that even the most minor dissident could reflect onto the youth. Many party
functionaries worried that the youth would slip into the attitude of the “skeptical
generation,” depicted often in the media by high-profile figures like Biermann, Werner
Bräunig and Peter Hacks. Others grew concerned over the new pathos and moral
engagements found in the works from authors like Wolf, who as former academic youth,
felt that they spoke and fought for an entire generation.156 Honecker, unsympathetic to
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these trends of socialist realism, lamented this misdirection: “We don‟t need moaning and
complaining bystanders, we need revolutionaries who will transform the world…What
matters is bringing the revolutionary heritage of their fathers before young people‟s eyes,
[presenting] their experiences in the class struggle vividly, graphically, excitingly, in a
convincing and differentiated fashion.”157
These flaws did not present a crisis, at least in the scope of those of the previous
decade, but rather an opening for the anti-reformers to criticize Ulbricht‟s preoccupation
with reform and his subsequent neglected responsibility toward the political-ideological
construction of culture and youth policies. Throughout 1964 and 1965, where Ulbricht
attempted to promote reform, the Honecker faction pursued ideological solidification of
issues related to these aspects of the SED platform. In April 1964 Ulbricht convened a
second Bitterfelder conference with the aim to consolidate the movement with the
principles of the NÖS by emphasizing the depiction of planners and managers rather than
factory-floor workers in artwork and literary pieces.158 The anti-reformers, opponents of
both the Bitterfelder Weg and the NÖS, diverted efforts on larger cultural issues, like the
political dissidence of professor Robert Havemann, who had created an ideological stir in
his public rebuke of the regime through his lectures on the “scientific aspects of
philosophical problems” and the popularity they received amongst colleagues and
students at the Humboldt University. After three years of lecturing on “the connection
between philosophical dogmatism and political ossification,” in the school term of 196364 his lectures reached maximal attendance, not just for the topics discussed but also
because they created an outlet for other grievances against the party. Although he had
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been removed from his university leadership post in summer 1963, that fall his lecture
series “Dialectic without Dogma?” spurred heated debates between his supporters and the
ZK‟s science faction. After months of a vicious smear campaign that depicted the
professor as a “philosophical crackpot” and revisionist, in March 1964, Hager reported to
the Politbüro that with the removal of Havemann from his professorship and the party the
matter had been isolated and resolved.159
Though the reforms of the Eleventh Plenum were months away, as chief
ideologist of the SED, Hager also concerned himself with issues that would facilitate the
reorientation of youth policy. In terms of legislation, he reasserted the party platform over
Ulbricht‟s personal push for reform, as evidenced in the Jugendgesetz (1964) and Law
Concerning the Unified Socialist Educational System (1965).160 In reaction to the
festivities of the Deutschlandtreffen, the most ardent exhibit of Ulbricht‟s
Jugendkommuniqué, both the MfK and the FDJ were targeted by the Ideologische
Kommission for restructuring. In December 1964, Minister of Culture Hans Bentzien
came under fire for the publication of certain discussions in the Neue Deutsche Literatur
(New German Literature, or NDL) that presented views out of sync with the position of
the party.161 By the fall of 1965, the anti-reformers had also influenced a restructuring of
the FDJ, which became stricter on both its cultural and organizational work. “The FDJ
leadership latched on quickly to the attempts of Honecker and Hager to link the alleged
development of more „sceptical‟ [sic] and objective attitudes among certain parts of the
159
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youth population to recent trends in GDR films and literature that portrayed East German
socialism in a less than flattering light.”162
The last hope that Ulbricht had in saving the more tolerant approach to “culturalintellectual life,” which was officially revoked by Horst Schumann‟s speech at the
Kahlschlag Plenum, was in his address to authors on 25 November 1965. In this meeting,
or open conversation, he hoped to address the issues of censorship and blacklisting and
come to an understanding about the elements that caused dissent between factions of
artists and writers, like Wolf Biermann and Stefan Heym, who had found outlets in
foreign presses. Honecker and Hager, however, were not interested in placating the
cultural sphere, or in coming to any sort of truce. They took the case to the Politbüro
meeting on 30 November. After an oral report from Hager and the closing discussions the
Politbüro concluded on the side of the anti-reformers. The open opposition to Biermann
and Heym would not only continue, but be propagated through ND, NDL and Sonntag.163
With this decisive victory of the anti-reformers, the rest of the year slid quickly
toward the clear-cutting of culture and youth policy at the Eleventh Plenum. This also
showed, however, that the attacks were not merely a response to the Jugendkommuniqué
or the efforts of cultural liberalism displayed at the Deutschlandtreffen. In December
1965, the reversion to a more conservative approach addressed not only a long-standing
crisis of culture, but as will become evident in the anti-reformers rebuttal to the
Deutschlandtreffen – the Wartburgtreffen in 1967 – also how it shaped national
consciousness.
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CHAPTER THREE
Wartburg, Revisited: “Bravely, Comrades, in Step!”164

In his opening speech of the Wartburgtreffen at the Palas der Wartburg on 14
October 1967, Kurt Hager explicitly stated the threefold purpose of the DDR‟s attempt to
commemorate the legacy of the Burschenschaften and the Wartburgfest of 1817: “We
wish to provide clarity about the basic problems of our time. We wish to show our people
what they can hope from their youth. We wish to show how the students of the DDR
contribute to the achievement of socialism.”165 Though this commemoration seems to
stretch party ideology, as the Burschenschaften were banned in the DDR, its inclusion of
international students and an official pledge to the state made Eisenach 1967 “no
historical reminiscence, no introspective self-reflection of the past – it was a
manifestation of the student youth of a socialist state that had adopted the humanist
heritage of the past and refined it under modern circumstances.”166
The aim of this chapter is to utilize the Wartburgtreffen as evidence of the shift in
party policy on the notion of national identity. Based on the facets of the original, this
1967 festival could be interpreted in a number of ways. However, this commemoration
primarily created a new platform for rallying the youth under a national consciousness
that did not concern itself with being the “better Germany.” Opposite the liberal cultural
and socialist patriotic policies of Ulbricht, Honecker and Hager implemented a more
conservative identity of youth that not only looked to the nineteenth-century construct of
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the student but also realigned the DDR with the proletarian internationalism of the USSR.
As a symbol of confidence in the DDR as a state, the anti-reformers embraced this
concept of national unity to pursue the development of a separate German socialist
nation.167
The objective of “refining humanist heritage under modern circumstances” tempts
the scholar to classify the Wartburgtreffen under the category of historical myth-building.
Despite the negative, unscientific connotation that the term “historical myth” may induce,
it actually performs five major functions for communist and non-communist societies
alike. These myths, both intentional and functional,168 “create and strengthen personal
identity and group identity; determine morality and societal norms; offer an explanation
of the creation of community and demonstrate the interconnectedness of all things; and
provide ready answer to the periodic blows of a complex and often unacceptable outside
reality.”169 As the SED attempted to consolidate its youth by creating an organization like
the FDJ that incorporated a German legacy with Soviet influence, this newfound semirehabilitation of the Burschenschaften fit the criteria of a historical myth. However, the
continued ban on the student fraternities and the subsequent bending of ideology in order
to commemorate them demands a different explanation.
Above every other attribute the Burschenschaften represented the drive towards a
celebrated German nationalism and the realization of German unity. To make sense of
how the SED overlooked this decisive factor, it is necessary to first define the
Burschenschaften, their ideology and their progression from 1817 to 1967. Throughout
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their existence, the Burschenschaften have typically been identified as nationalistic,
bourgeois constructs, some of which more recently in the twentieth century harbored
Right-leaning tendencies, such as xenophobia (and anti-Semitism) and chauvinism.
Ideologically, however, these fraternities originally promoted concepts of honor and
community. As university constructs, their basic philosophy emphasized education.
However, as progenitors to the aspiring new German state, they extended the emphasis of
academics to include political awareness and self-cultivation, both of which would help
them achieve and actively participate in the proposed civil society of the future German
Fatherland. This notion of nationhood and civil duty not only defined their political
stances, but also reiterated the devotion to their Christian (Protestant) roots.170 Because
other student organizations, like the Korporationen, shied away from political
involvement and limiting criteria, like Protestantism, the Burschenschaften were indeed a
new construction and, for many nationalist movements, a shining example of youth
dedication and involvement in the state.
Though the Burschenschaften represented this new, revolutionary ideal, their first
congregated meeting in October 1817 at the Wartburg Castle near Eisenach presented a
mixed legacy for the next two hundred years. The scene of this gathering has been
immortalized as the platform for the narrative of student national consciousness.
“As dawn broke, the citizens of Eisenach awoke to an exceptionally clear autumn
morning. The usual mist of the mountains had lowered into silver hoarfrost, and
from the streams of light from the rising sun, the Wartburg protruded into
extraordinary clarity against the backdrop of the other natural surroundings of this
spiritual town. At six o‟clock the first bells of the tower formally proclaimed the
opening of the festival. At eight o‟clock a second ringing assembled the
Burschenschaften, most clothed in black and ornately decorated with oak leaves
from the nearby mountain, in the town square, where they eagerly queued up in
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pairs to scale the notorious Wartburg. A short half hour later, the mass of one
thousand students and citizens, brandishing the flag of the Jena Burschenschaft,
embarked on this symbolic trek171, resounding lyrics from the song, We lead a
free life…”172
From this scene, little can be deduced about what the Burschenschaften stood for, yet
numerous firsthand accounts attest that, “Never before had German history, perhaps not
even the whole of Europe‟s Völkerleben, seen such a patriotic festival, celebrated by
spirited youth, who in the face of their people fraternized into a youth organization for
their Fatherland and justice.”173 From 17 to 19 October, a mass of students and professors
from the thirteen Protestant universities, numbering between four and five hundred,
congregated in remembrance of the third centenary of the Reformation and the fourth
anniversary of the Völkerschlacht, which also happen to initiate the birth of the united
German Burschenschaft.174 For these few days, the students fraternized, attended
speeches (most notably by Heinrich Riemann and Ludwig Rödiger), and celebrated their
new-found national consciousness.
One particular display, the infamous book burning, or “fire on the Wartenberg,”
stigmatized the fraternities as radical nationalists, even though this was not a concerted
effort on the part of all Burschenschafter. This claim later tried (unsuccessfully) to
differentiate the Gießener Schwarzen, the radical faction who instigated the event, from
the rest of the movement to avoid censorship and disbanding. While participation was
hard to judge, many sources confirm the specifics of the event. On the evening of 18
October, this faction ascended the Wartenberg, and after an inspirational, albeit
171

Dietrich Georg Kieser, Das Wartburgfest am 18. Oktober 1817, in seiner Entstehung, Ausführung und
Folgen: Nach Actenstücken und Augenzeugnissen (Jena: Friedrich Frommann, 1818), 22-3.
172
Friedrich Johannes Frommann, Das Burschenfest auf dem Wartburg (Jena: 1818), 24-6.
173
Karl Hoffmeister, Beschreibung des Festes auf der Wartburg. Ein Sendschreiben an die Gutgesinnten
(Essen: 1818), 1.
174
Dietrich von Engelhardt, “Lorenz Oken und das Wartburgfest 1817 mit einem Abdruck des
konfiszierten Heftes 195 der Isisˮ N.T.M. 11 (2003): 1.

72
incendiary, speech by Jena student Ludwig Rödiger, the assembly threw items into the
fire that represented “un-German” ideas, namely newspapers, like the Deutsche
Beobachter and Fränkische Merkur, and books by twenty authors, including the “Russian
spy,” August von Kotzebue. Three additional items, which represented the repressiveness
of the Prussian and Austrian regimes, were added to the fire: an Ulanenschnürleib (part
of a Prussian military uniform), a “Pracht- Prahl- and Patent-Zopf” (the top part of the
helmet of a Hessian military uniform), and two corporal sticks (one from Nassau and the
other from Vienna).175
This blatant political statement caused an increased alertness in both Austria and
Prussia, and the investigation into the murder of von Kotzebue the following year
concluded that the Burschenschaften had devised a covert plot to overthrow the German
Confederation. Alongside the evidence of the Burschenschaften credo, its “Principles and
Beliefs,” in which certain passages demanded a “republican” constitution and a Germany
united under a monarchy, Prince Klemens von Metternich issued the Carlsbad Decrees in
August 1819. This legislation banned the Burschenschaften, stripped “overly
nationalistic” professors of their posts (who, in some cases, were also imprisoned or
exiled), and censored select authors connected to the Junges Deutschland movement.176
While these measures seemed to be untenably extreme, the stigma it attached to the
Burschenschaften continued to stimulate the debate over the political nature of the
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Wartburgfest well into the twentieth century, both for Marxist and non-Marxist
scholars.177
As the Carlsbad Decrees outlawed the Burschenschaften, the fraternities moved
underground. With the continued pursuit of the establishment of a German national state
and the republican ideals, they participated in several key events throughout the rest of
the nineteenth century. In 1832, under the disguise of a gathering similar to a fair, the
Burschenschaften resurfaced in the assembly of the Hambacher Fest. Parading the ideals
of liberty, national unity, and civil rights, the fraternities also addressed their support for
the Polish people, who in waves of forced emigration demanded the formation of a Polish
national state.178 With the attempted revolution in 1848/49, the Burschenschaften
reestablished themselves as champions of the cause. Not only did they organize a second
Wartburgfest, but they also appealed their demands to the Frankfurt Assembly. 179 With
the establishment of the Second Reich in 1871 under Otto von Bismarck, however, the
Burschenschaften lost a certain amount of following. National unity had been achieved,
yet much to the chagrin of the Burschenschaften, they played a relatively small role in the
new state. Their philosophy of political, religious, academic and self- cultivation was not
realized when their nation-state was formed.
Under the conservative tactics of Bismarck, this disgruntlement with new Reich
left comparatively little room for a concerted effort of dissent. The Burschenschaften as
an academic construct remained within the university system, but garnered little
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widespread appeal at the turn of the century. Following the First World War, however,
the fraternities gained some momentum. Popular discontent with the Weimar Republic
and its acceptance of significantly reduced borders opened up the debate of the German
state. Included in the rhetoric of the Dolchstoß theory, the Burschenschaften also became
increasingly, more publicly anti-Semitic. Though the debates on Jewish inclusion in the
fraternities dated back to 1815, the open rebuke not just of Jewish inclusion but of Jewish
citizenship was now part of the Burschenschaft platform. These anti-Semitic, nationalistic
policies allowed for the effortless incorporation of the Burschenschaften into the Hitler
youth organizations. Though the Burschenschaften originally pursued modern ideals
based on the French Revolution, the development of the nation-state geared them to more
radical tendencies in the twentieth century. As a result of this Right-leaning ideology,
with the defeat of fascism, the DDR refused re-establishing this subversive, imperialist
construct.
Though the DDR acknowledged the importance of Wartburg in the German
historical past, for the first half of the socialist regime, the Burschenschaft Memorial at
the Wartburg Castle remained “a thorn in [its] side.”180 Despite the Stalin Notes of 1952,
as late as 1953, the Wartburg had continued to symbolize the “indestructibility of the
German nation, as a reminder of Germany‟s unity and independence.” 181 In the 1960s,
however, the protection of the Berlin Wall produced a renewed interest in the history of
the fraternities, which sought to reform the “deformed picture of German history, the
product of a purposeful reactionary historiography” into one of scientific, progressive
180
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tradition.182 With the sponsorship of Kurt Hager, in October 1967, the FDJ sponsored a
ceremonial weekend gathering of students at the legendary Wartburg castle near
Eisenach. Outwardly, the event appeared to be a commemoration. It kept the tone of the
original, focusing on the structure of the days‟ events around speeches, many of which
referenced renowned Burschenschafter Heinrich Riemann and Ludwig Rödiger, and, in
free time, encouraging fraternization, through dialogue, dances, and concerts. The twenty
thousand congregates were university students, and although the majority of those present
came from the ranks of the FDJ and East German universities, select students from the
BRD183 and socialist states, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland, were also invited to
attend. Despite its legacy as the birthplace of the Burschenschaft movement of the early
nineteenth-century, ironically no members of the current Burschenschaften were asked to
partake in the festivities on the Wartburg.
While this festival did not fully commemorate the events of 1817, the personal
directorship of Kurt Hager made it more than just another attempt of the SED to fill the
free time of students with cultural activities.184 Without the knowledge of his antireforming antics, one could perceive this statement as an outreach of Walter Ulbricht‟s
Jugendkommuniqué. However, the events of 1964 and 1965, in which he collaborated
with Erich Honecker and other anti-reformers to reverse the reforms of culture and youth
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policy, dismiss this interpretation. In many ways the 1967 Wartburgtreffen in Eisenach
represented for the anti-reformers what the 1964 Deutschlandtreffen did for Ulbricht.
Though much more exclusive in scope, this festival, in fitting with modern
circumstances, nonetheless preached the conservatism of the Kahlschlag Plenum and
issued a new stance on youth policy. This was evidenced most obviously as the students
recited the communal pledge of the “Manifest of the Youth and Students of the DDR,”
which replaced Ulbricht‟s pillar of the Jugendkommuniqué, “Trust and Responsibility to
the Youth.”
The original Wartburgfest symbolized national unity, religious fervor, and
political malcontent. In the 1960s, the parallels were not that far removed. The quest for
national unity, however, became the main objective in this iteration on the Wartburg.
Although Ulbricht still envisioned an eventual German confederation, the anti-reformers
redefined socialist patriotism through class orientation. This “national unity” was thus
sought through the congregation of delegates from the working class. Most visiting
associations represented came from fellow socialist states like Czechoslovakia (CSM),
Poland (ZSP), and the Soviet Union (Komsomol); however, the shared past with its West
German neighbors invoked the inclusion of students from the BRD (VDS, SDS, ISB).185
Although the SED often used the socialist rhetoric to ally itself with the youth segment of

185

SAPMO BArch, DY/ 24/ 6187, Anlage 5, 1. A complete discussion on the West German New Left
would be outside the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to note the line of communication
between the SED and the New Left. Ulbricht sought alignment with the SPD (in hopes of eventually
achieving a German Confederation), yet the New Left was not a consolidated ideological movement. The
SDS, for example, was disowned by the SPD, yet was welcomed to partake in the youth festivals in the
DDR. Also, the icon Rudi Dutschke presented a dissonance between the DDR and the realization of
socialism. Dutschke fled the DDR in the early 1960s, yet preached similar discontents of the DDR with the
BRD. As the New Left began to radicalize in the late 1960s, it formed different factions, like the RAF, who
presented an identity out of line with socialists of both Germanys. As this radicalization gained momentum,
and the DDR focused itself away from alignment with the West German youth, cooperation with youth
organizations in the Bloc (as evidenced in the Wartburgtreffen) grew.

77
the BRD („Arbeiterjugend der BRD‟), both the tentative program and the official party
publication indicate that the delegates were divided according to the conflict of nation
and class. For example, on 14 October, the discussions between FDJ delegates and the
international representatives were held at the Parkhotel, while similar discussions
between the FDJ and their West German guests were held at the Thüringer Hof.186
Despite the pledges of the international brotherhood, German national consciousness still
lurked beneath the surface in a very palpable way.
This refinement of the legacy to modern circumstances did not occur without
mixed judgment. On the one side, the SED worked to remove the stigmas of the
„bourgeois‟ quality of the Burschenschaften and the „radically political‟ Wartburgfest in
attempts to prove their state as the true heirs to the student movement. As Hager noted,
“It was no coincidence that the flag of the Wartburgfest, decorated black-red-gold, would
be the „German tricolor‟ of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. These traditions of a
forward-leaning, anti-feudalistic, striving bourgeois youth organization belong to us.”187
On the other side, the SED was quick to distinguish between the students of 1817 and
those of 1967 to avoid making heroes out of the Burschenschaften. The solution to this
precarious

reinterpretation

was

to

positively highlight

the

contributions

the

Burschenschaften had made to the formation of the modern, progressive citizen without
failing to identify their weaknesses.
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Two particular events contributed to the anti-reformers‟ success in forming a
cohesive

and

resolute

response

to

Ulbricht‟s

Jugendkommuniqué

and

the

Deutschlandtreffen with the “Manifest of German Youth and Students of the DDR” and
the Wartburgtreffen. The first of these was the official, West German commemoration of
the Jenaer Burschenschaft on 12 June 1965, in West Berlin. Discontent was voiced
primarily by intellectuals and party functionaries. In the article, “The German
Burschenschaft in the Year 1965 – Contrary to Honor, Freedom, Fatherland”, Ludwig
Elm attacked the antidemocratic, militaristic, anti-Semitic and Nazi elements of the West
that pretended to honor the ideals of the nineteenth-century revolutionary. By examining
the Burschentage of the 1950s and 1960s, Elm also concluded that “the current
„burschenschaftlich‟ concept of honor [and freedom and Fatherland] is backwards and
antagonistic to progressivism.”188 Willi Schröder and Günter Steiger, leading DDR
nineteenth-century scholars, seconded the problem of Western claims to the legacy,
adding that the “current situation of student and political bondage” by the “Bonn elite”
counteracted the revolutionary aims of the Burschenschaften.189
The party took a more formative and public stance against the West German
commemoration. In the dedicatory ceremony, Bonn‟s Vice Chancellor and FDP (Freie
Demokratische Partei, or Free Democratic Party) member Erich Mende had explained
that for the BRD the commemoration meant that “the idealism of the German
Burschenschaften would be essentially more valuable for the future of the German
people, for the materialism of every student functionary wanted to make the student
188
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stipend the utmost principle of his/her work.”190 Despite this socialist-leaning, semialtruistic objective, the majority of the SED still felt the need to resolutely differentiate its
students (and development) from the majority in the BRD, with whom DDR citizens “had
no interlocution.” Rather, the only similarities of this heritage that the DDR shared with
the West were those “who today in West Germany are against the inhumanity of the
American aggression in Vietnam, against the aggressive sole agency of pretension,
against atomic armament, against Neonazism and emergency laws.”191
This sentiment against the West and its interpretation of a shared history,
however, did not dissuade Ulbricht from pursuing dialogue with the SPD. Though the
Politbüro had officially suspended speaker exchange with the West German party on 28
June 1966, Ulbricht continued to support efforts of rapprochement. His steadfast stance
on the matter was evidenced in the Twelfth Plenum in April 1966, where he directly
challenged the tendency of party members to criticize the SPD rather than the CDU,
noting that “over half of the SPD‟s candidates for the Federal elections” had publicly
rebuked the contentious issues of nuclear armament and the emergency laws.192
Throughout 1967, Ulbricht did not abandon this objective, and he even went so far as to
warn the party against “confusing democratic centralism with „bureaucracy‟ and
„sterility‟.”193
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This conflict of party attitudes suffused the Seventh Party Congress of 17-22
April 1967, the second event in which the anti-reformers gained success in trumping
Ulbricht. The congress established what Frank Reuter terms the final and most decisive
turning point in the development of history as science in the DDR. With the exclamation
of the “developing social system of socialism,” the party initiated a concept that brought
about long-range methodical and organizational consequences. History was converted to
an instrument that could verify the DDR as a “logical historical station” of the German
past.194 Under the direction of FDJ chairman Horst Schumann, youth policy and the tasks
of the FDJ were also refurbished. Schumann pledged that in order to obtain maximum
political, economic, and cultural successes, the work of the FDJ must be expanded to
sectors of the economy and disseminated more thoroughly amongst the youth. Although
it did not adopt any sensational decrees in this congress, the party announced the full
achievement of socialism in the DDR as the main objective.195
Building off the premise that youth policy and the FDJ needed restructuring, the
FDJ convened its Eighth Parliament just weeks after the Seventh Party Congress. From
10-13 May, 2,400 delegates met in Karl-Marx-Stadt (today Chemnitz) to discuss
Schumann‟s lecture entitled, “The responsibility of the youth in socialist society and the
work of the FDJ.”196 Though he submitted a written opening address, Ulbricht was not
present, and thus conceded the direction of the parliament to Honecker, who delivered his
statement. Despite his absence, in this address he did concentrate on certain aspects that
should dictate the pace and decrees of the meeting. Drawing on the conclusions of the
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Seventh Party Congress, Ulbricht reiterated first and foremost that “the Seventh Party
Congress invoked you, the heirs of the Communist Manifesto, to achieve socialism
through sound ties with the worker class and to master the scientific-technical
revolution.”197 The internationalist scope of socialist credo would not limit the
achievement of socialism to the. Rather, Ulbricht pledged the main task of the FDJ in the
following years to prove to the West German workers that there could only be one path to
the solution of the German question – under the leadership of the working class.198
Given Ulbricht‟s preoccupation with reforming youth policy, the stress on the
dialogue with West German workers was unsurprisingly extended to include West
German students. Though the address was directed at both the FDJ leadership and the
numerous FDJ youth present, Ulbricht specifically dedicated segments to the younger
generation in the BRD and the DDR. Under the salutation “Liebe junge Freund in
Westdeutschland!” he reassured West Germans of the commitment of the DDR to help
them overcome the militaristic, fascist and capitalist class in order that they, like their
East German counterparts, could enjoy “a peaceful future and a happy life.”199 To the
students of the DDR, then, it was vital that they understand and promote the unity and
comradeship of [all-German] youth.
As the events of 1989 confirmed, the solution of the German question was not
achieved under the unification of the working class, or under the SED leadership; yet, the
Eighth Parliament did reach a solution to the question of youth policy, though not in
Ulbricht‟s favor. The key to the triumph of the anti-reformers in the inner-party struggle,
which culminated in 1967, was not the winning over of party officials to the conservative
197
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platform, but rather the replacement of primary „Ulbricht men‟ in offices that directly
affected the direction of youth policy.200 This process started in January 1966 with the
removal of two key liberals, Hans Bentzien and Kurt Turba. Bentzien, Minister of
Culture, had come under fire in late 1964 for allowing the publication of certain
discussions in the Neue Deutsche Literatur (New German Literature, or NDL) that
presented views out of sync with the position of the party. At the bequest of Hager, he
was replaced by previous director of the Aufbau Verlag, Klaus Gysi. 201 After an open
altercation with Honecker over the results of the Eleventh Plenum, Turba, one of
Ulbricht‟s most ardent supporters and head of the Jugendkommission and the ZK‟s youth
department, was unseated and forced to relinquish his titles to Siegfried Lorenz, a
conservative who held previous experience in the ZR of the FDJ and the
Volkskammer.202 In May 1967, at the Eighth Parliament of the FDJ, the last of Ulbricht‟s
youth reformers – Horst Schumann, first ZR secretary – was replaced by Honecker‟s
hand-picked favorite, Günther Jahn.203 Though Honecker did not usurp complete party
control until 1971, his take-over of this sector of the SED had profound consequences,
both in removing „Ulbricht men‟ and in implementing more conservative policies that
ensured a closer relationship with the KPdSU.
The Wartburgtreffen was predicated on this triumph of the anti-reformers, yet
archival records indicate that Hager had taken the initiative on this historic topic as early
as March 1966. In the compilation of a report to the Politbüro, Hager briefly discussed
200
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the state of preparations for the event of 13-15 October 1967 while addressing the
“Problems of the youth work after the Eleventh Plenum of the ZK,” both of which were
addressed in the plans for the Seventh Party Congress. In investigating the youth issue,
particularly the shift in youth policy after Kahlschlag and the responsibility of the youth
in the role of party organization, Hager concluded that: “For the solution of this work
under the leadership of the party organization all state, leading economic and social
organs carry a great responsibility. The FDJ plays a special role as helper and
Kampfreserve of the SED in the development of general initiatives of the youth in the
preparation of the VII. Party Congress. Its [responsibility] is to give help and support
through all leadership and party organizations.”204 This ushering of the FDJ to the
forefront was indisputably a result of the anti-reformers‟ objection to Ulbricht‟s proposed
modifying the FDJ and, as a result, an outreach of their successes at the Eleventh Plenum.
What this analysis of the Wartburgtreffen shows, aside from its addition into the
history annals of the DDR, is a response by the anti-reformers to Ulbricht‟s reform
policies. By adopting the “humanist heritage” of the Burschenschaften, not only was the
Honecker faction able to ground its conservatism in the Marxist-Leninist propensity
towards progressiveness, but it was also able to offer alternatives to the
Jugendkommuniqué and the Deutschlandtreffen. In effect, the “Manifestation of Youth
and Students of the DDR” and the Wartburgtreffen aimed to reshape youth policy and
with it the national consciousness of the DDR, from one centered on the German question
to one more allied with the socialist cause. “The appreciation of the 150th anniversary of
the Wartburgfest through the united socialist youth organizations proves that the FDJ
preserves and carries on the heritage of the progressive bourgeois-democratic powers of
204
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the past.”205 Outwardly, the Wartburgtreffen aimed to counteract the West‟s claiming of
this classical heritage, yet it also served as a rallying point for a congregation of
international students to celebrate the DDR as the first state to “assume the humanist
cause of the Burschenschafter of 1817.”206
By assigning the FDJ (and the youth as a whole) with the task of helping the
leadership and party organizations, the anti-reformers echoed both the lessons of
inclusion initiated by Ulbricht earlier in the decade and the example set by the
Wartburgfest 1817. However, this faction expected a pledge of support to the state in
return. In this celebration, the students, united by the pillars of socialism, peace, and
freedom, would openly and unanimously proclaim allegiance to the state (and to
socialism) through the “Manifestation of Youth and Students of the DDR”. Like the
“Trust and Responsibility to the Youth” issued by Ulbricht, this pledge focused on youth
involvement in the shaping of socialism, but not with the liberal undertones of open
dialogue. Under the responsibility of the FDJ, Ministries of Higher Education and of
Culture, and the Office for Youth Questions, the youth were to unquestioningly
acknowledge their avowal to the state and to the working class.207
The “Manifest” that the various youth organizations at the Palas der Wartburg at
10:15 a.m. on 14 October recited derived from eight theses. The first two proclaimed the
willingness and the pride that “we, young workers, members of the farmers‟ cooperative
and students of the DDR” held in joining the FDJ and the party leadership to build the
solidification and the socialist future of the DDR. This could be ensured by following the
205
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decrees of the Seventh Party Congress of the SED and the Eighth Parliament of the FDJ.
With this zeal to continue the best traditions of German history, these youth would be
proven to be the heirs to “all progressive and revolutionary movements in the history of
the Germany people.”
Theses three through five centered on the worker tradition of the DDR and how
that would help develop the communal system of socialism outside of East German
borders. This included a renewed commitment to the scientific-technological revolution,
as workers not only needed to master the science of these studies but also to learn the life
principles that such trades taught. As part of the international proletariat, the pursuit of
this revolution and of socialism would not only better the citizens of the DDR, but also
help the international struggle against the imperialist West. This commitment to the other
socialist states, primarily the Soviet Union, would accomplish the achievements of the
upcoming fiftieth commemoration of the October Revolution and the twentieth
anniversary of statehood for the DDR.
The final three theses address the slogan of the “Manifest” and explain the
inclusion of international youth organizations, rather than just the youth of the DDR.
Based on the premise that everything that could be accomplished in the strengthening of
the DDR “will at the same time solidify the socialist powers against the aggression of
West German imperialism,” it would be in the interest of the progressive youth in the
BRD to join this cause. Thesis seven then invokes the worker youth and the western
progressives to join in the establishment of democratic relations and fight against the
plans of the “emergency dictatorship.” With this participation, the West German youth
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would be redeemed and united with the DDR in the historical task of separating the
German nation and its democratic forces from imperialism.208
Though the emphasis in the declaration of intent of the “Manifest” rested on the
German youth, both from the BRD and DDR, its pledge to the struggle for international
socialism projected a new sense of national consciousness. As previously stated, this
incorporated a class-based identity rather than a nation-based consciousness. In the
Wartburgtreffen, the residual tendencies to focus on the inter-German nation versus state
debate can be seen. However, the inclusion of the October Revolution into the discussion
supports Honecker‟s quest for realignment with the Soviet model and the resolution of
the question of reunification. Though historians like Wolfgang Bergsdorf tend to
separately analyze the three historical milestones of 1967 – the Reformation, the October
Revolution, and the Wartburgfest – the party did not treat them as detached events.209 For
instance, ND coverage of the October Revolution published alongside that of the
Wartburgfest. The issue from 14 October 1967 illustrates this interconnectedness.
Articles on the Wartburgtreffen, like “Youth celebrate Wartburgfest” and “What did the
young Burschen want with the old mountain?” are intermingled with those that reinforce
solidarity with the KPdSU, such as “1917 – Year of the great change” and “To the
protection of the Soviet Union: 50 years of friendship between German and Soviet
workers”. In the closing words of his official speech at the Wartburgtreffen, Kurt Hager
replicated this „friendship‟: “Almost to the day, 100 years after the first Wartburgfest of
208
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the German Burschenschaften the Great Socialist October Revolution of Humanity
opened the door to a new epoch in history. It was not a coincidence, but [an instance of]
historical legitimacy!”210
With the proclamation of the “Manifest” and the espousal of a new party stance
on national consciousness, the Wartburgtreffen 1967, as the Sonntag article proclaims,
can hardly be limited to a simple commemoration. Nor does this event seem paradoxical
or contradictory to party ideology in light of the decrees of the Seventh Party Congress
and the Eighth Parliament of the FDJ. For the anti-reformers, the Wartburgtreffen served
as verification that the DDR was the “victor of history.”211 By adopting “only the good
traditions” of the early bourgeois student movement, such as the indivisible unity of
youth; the active struggle of youth alongside the working class; the participation of youth
in the important objectives of building socialism; the struggle for the enforcement of the
socialist educational system; and the active struggle against the aggressive imperialism of
West Germany, the DDR would be able to not only ensure the future of socialism on its
soil but also contribute to the international socialist revolution.212
By utilizing this tradition, the anti-reformers were also able to proffer a more
affirmative stance on the German question. Though Ulbricht remained in power until
1971, the replacement of many of his staunchest supporters limited his ability to stop
Honecker‟s platform of Abgrenzung in pursuit of “real existing socialism.” While other
factors, primarily the NÖS and rapprochement with the West (even after the Grand
Coalition of 1966), contributed to Ulbricht‟s downfall, youth policy and the role of
210
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national consciousness in forging it unquestionably played a more decisive role than
many historians have given it credit. Youth policy, especially along cultural and
nationalistic lines, divided the party, the German nation, and history.
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CONCLUSION
“He who has the youth has the power”?
The quote, “He who has the youth has the power,” or as tweaked by SED party
functionaries, “He who has the cadres has the future,” has long been a line of thought in
political circles in modern German history. In the 1960s, the struggle for the direction in
youth policy equated to the inner-party struggle of the SED for power, in which the
conservative, hardlining anti-reformers like Erich Honecker and Kurt Hager consistently
challenged the liberal, reforming faction led by Walter Ulbricht. From 1961 to 1964,
under the slogan, “Ein Staat der Jugend,” Ulbricht‟s initial rigidity in the areas of
conscription and overhauling the main youth organization, the FDJ, led to a period of
relative openness between the state and the youth. In this openness, termed “Trust and
Responsibility to the Youth” (or, more typically, the second Jugendkommuniqué of
1963), reform worked to modernize socialism, through both the economic
transformations of the NÖS and the technical revolution, and produce a new national
consciousness that, shaped by culture and practiced by youth, would ensure the grooming
of the next generation of socialists and, in effect, the success of the German socialist
state.
Though the 1970s would evidence a more liberal, culture-embracing Honecker, in
response to Ulbricht‟s liberalism in the 1960s the anti-reforming faction sought a more
conservative approach to the modernization of the DDR. To these hardliners, the liberties
taken by Ulbricht to promote the DDR as the model socialist state in place of the Soviet
Union went too far. As Ulbricht focused predominantly on forging a new, collective
socialist national culture and identity, the anti-reformers found the cultural element to be
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much too subversive. Through a commitment to clamp down on the liberties of both
youth culture, as illustrated in the Jugendkommuniqué (1963), and the cultural
intelligentsia, many of whom used the opening of the system to sideline pursuing the
party line in order to highlight the flaws of the system. As a result of these cultural issues,
by late 1965 the anti-reformers gained increasing support within the party and, with the
Eleventh Plenum, effectively halted Ulbricht‟s cultural thaw.
The intent of the conservative undercurrent was to effectively replace Ulbricht‟s
designs with its own. This was illustrated in the pledge of the “Manifest of Youth and
Students of the DDR” at the Wartburgtreffen of 1967. Though not as illustrious as
Ulbricht‟s emphasis on youth involvement in the building and maintaining of socialism,
the roots of this event helped draw on a longer standing issue that Ulbricht had not been
able to achieve: the adoption of the platform that the East German youth, as evidenced by
the progressive elements of the revolutionary student, were not only of a separate state
from their imperialist neighbors, but of a separate nation. The legacy of Eisenach helped
to propagate the youth as the true heirs to the German Classicists.
This analysis of youth policy from 1961-1967 not only illustrates this inner-party
struggle for control but it also reveals an intriguing interpretation of the long-standing
concept of the German nation. In this time period, the SED struggled in rallying its youth
to the indoctrination of socialism as well as creating an allegiance to the state. At the
head of these difficulties lay the issue of the German question. The long-standing
tradition of the concept of the German nation had been tarnished by the rampant
nationalism of the Nazi dictatorship, yet the separation of the Germans into difference
states and ideologies did not erase the sense of collective identity along the lines of the
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heritage of the Volk. As both the BRD and the DDR chastised the Nazi „misuse‟ of
national identity, and thus struggled with overcoming this harrowing past, each was
nonetheless confronted with the disorientation of not being the only German nation-state.
In attempts to unite its youth as forgers of socialism, both as “patriots and
internationalists,” the SED reverted to the power of the national construct. The use of
„nation‟ became another divisive factor of youth policy and the inner-party debates. This
is illustrated particularly by each faction‟s utilization of the youth festival. As part of his
campaign to produce “ein Staat der Jugend” and with it the “better Germans,” in 1964,
Ulbricht sanctioned the Deutschlandtreffen. As half a million German youth from both
the BRD and DDR congregated in the streets of Berlin, Ulbricht welcomed the student
dialogue of the young socialists and left-leaning students by embracing the all-German,
national element of the festival. By supporting more liberal policies, particularly in the
student voice and the incorporation of Western elements into DDR culture, Ulbricht
created an event that, through open dialogue on contentious issues like rearmament,
really resonated with youth from both states.
Though the Deutschlandtreffen was considered a success by both the participants
and the party as a whole, the anti-reformers became alarmed at the dangers of Western
exposure. In its display of united youth, the inter-German dialogue undoubtedly spurred
discussion of German reunification. While Ulbricht envisioned an eventual German
Confederation under socialist terms, the Honecker faction, more allegiant to the
proletarian internationalism of the Soviet Union, dismissed these efforts. Instead, they
made concerted efforts to distance Western influence on the grounds of creating “real
existing socialism” and a German socialist nation. In rebuttal to the all-German element
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of the Deutschlandtreffen, the anti-reformers pursued similar rallying tactics in presenting
its own youth festival. Though not as grandiose, the Wartburgtreffen of 1967 aimed to
shift youth consciousness and student dialogue away from discussions of Germandom
(and reunification) by reinterpreting the nineteenth-century ideals of national unity and
brotherhood of the Burschenschaften. By these efforts, the anti-reformers hoped to
solidify proletarian allegiance with East German national consciousness.
With the passing of the 1968 constitution, the SED officially replaced the clause
of “one whole German nation”213 that had been the basis since 1949. Based on the antireformers success in unseating Ulbricht, removing the cultural threat of subversion, and
achieving this new national status, it seemed as though the youth question was indeed the
answer to power and to the future. However, for the rest of the national period, which
lasted up until the crumbling of the Wall in 1989, Honecker would never achieve another
period like Ulbricht‟s “state of youth.”
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